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The reverend who rode with the Rockers

Most people give "Rockers" a wide berth. These leather-jacketed young people on their heavy motorbikes have formed gangs modelled on America's Hell's Angels.

They are quick with a knife, and the police keep a watchful eye on them.

Psychologists say they are intellectually infantile with a pronounced drive to destroy.

But for Berlin's Pastor Bernd Jürgen Hamann they are first and foremost people — people with a heart, with problems, fears and a longing for security.

It is not only the Christian's love of his fellow man that motivates Rev Hamann, who has been devoting much of his working day to Berlin's Rockers over the past eight years — so much so that he has been nicknamed the "Rocker Pastor."

Rev Hamann is himself a passionate motorbike rider, so he has at least one thing in common with these outsiders of society. On a number of occasions he has mediated after Rocker excesses in his parish and after an attack on a city home for juveniles.

One day, he drove up with his motorbike at a pub where the Rockers used to gather, talked to them and eventually gained their confidence. In the end, they not only respected him but made him a member of the gang.

The 38-year-old pastor agreed to join them on condition that he would never be part of any criminal act and that he would never raise his hand against anybody.

It was hard for the Rockers to accept these terms since a Rocker who does not lash out is unimaginable.

Eventually, Rev Hamann started working for his gang in earnest. He managed to get them a place where they could meet and he was always ready to give advice when they came to him with their problems.

But above all, he tried to channel their excess energy and pent-up aggressions and to prevent them from breaking the law.

He organised drives to the countryside, working on the principle that this would keep them out of mischief.

The group, Rev Hamann has come to realise, is of central importance for the Rockers — a haven and a substitute for the family. It is also a substitute for the rest of the world, which has rejected them and which they therefore despise.

One trait they all have in common is the inability to understand that what they are doing is wrong. It is always the "others" who are at fault. Strength is their only ideal and to demonstrate it they lash out. Seeing the fear they cause in other people gives them self-assurance and makes them feel strong.

Rev Hamann has never had any illusions about the success of his work. He has never thought that he could turn these toughs into a pious flock.

So he has never tried. The emphasis of his work does not lie on teaching Christianity: he sees himself as a social worker rather than as a pastor.

When the first group of Rockers he joined broke up he joined another, staying with it for four years. Like with the previous group, he gained the Rockers' confidence after much hard work.

He organised leisure activities and visited group members in jail. He baptised the illegitimate children and married the occasional couple.

Above all, he managed to channel their activities and criminal acts dwindled to zero.

This remained so until a new generation in the group took over. The older members left and the young ones that followed opposed the pastor. The basis of cooperation became increasingly untenable and crime began again. Rev Hamann left the group in 1979.

Were all these years of work in vain? The pastor admits that he achieved too little. His wish to turn these men into "decent Rockers" did not materialise.

But he has gathered enough experience which will help him in future projects with the bullyboys. As in the past, he can be certain of the Church's support.

Axel Vörtmann

(Nordwest Zeitung, 24 May 1980)



Rev Hamann

(Pho

Jochen Mass

Continued from page 15

tyres wore down the rear axle tended to get out of control on fast corners I decided to steer clear of every last ounce of risk."

So Mass is a man who has himself and his car under control, who can calculate his likely success and who is now successfully doing so.

At Jarama, for instance, the 22-year-old US driver Eddie Cheever was forced to retire after setting the pace for lap after lap. Cheever was so exhausted he collapsed after he climbed out of the car.

Mass felt sorry for him. "He was driving so well I should not have begrudged him a place at the finish — behind me, mind you," he said.

In the Spanish grand prix Mass ranked 14th in training and slowly but surely worked his way to the front. He is an outstanding long-distance man and it showed.

Once he had worked his way into second place all he wanted to do was to last the distance. Alan Jones, the winner, is not a driver to wager his last shirt either, preferring to drive quietly and sensibly.

At one point Jones found he was on his own, pressed by no-one, on the straight. He promptly slowed down, his water temperature having reached 135°C. "It was a miracle the engine didn't let me down," he later said.

He came first, Mass second. But the result still awaits ratification.

Jochen von Osterroth

(Die Welt, 3 June 1980)

Rubbish contest

Dustbins may not be an art form but Paderborn, Westphalia, has sponsored an art competition with prizes for the most imaginatively embellished of its 23,000 mouse-grey bins.

Householders have been given the go-ahead to brighten up the street scene by painting dustbins any colour they want.

dpa

(Die Welt, 2 June 1980)

Anti-terror policeman says the risk is measurable

All that the friends and neighbours of Rainer Wolfgram, 35, know about him is: he is a civil servant, drives an Opel Ascona and leaves for work at 7 a.m. carrying a brown briefcase.

And this is all they are permitted to know for Herr Wolfgram works for a special commando dubbed SEK. SEK is a sort of GSG9 of the *Länder* (GSG9 being the special federal border police unit trained for anti-terrorist missions).

There is nothing in Rainer Wolfgram's appearance that would resemble a James Bond. His hair is thinning and he looks more like a schoolmaster than an anti-terrorism specialist.

"Adventurers are the last thing we need. We're a bunch of highly qualified experts in our field," he says.

His wife Ingrid had the wits scared out of her when he told her five years ago that he had joined SEK.

"But," says Herr Wolfgram, "that was only because she didn't know what the job was all about. Sure, it's a risky business, but the risk is calculable."

What makes it calculable is the strict selection before an applicant is permitted to join. Wolfgram worked at a police precinct and later as a plainclothes patrolman. When he applied for SEK five years ago he had to undergo extensive tests about familiarity with the law, the ability to endure physical stress, psychological stability and speed of reaction.

Lower Saxony's SEK has 50 men. A team of five is always ready for acti[on at] 20 minutes' notice.

The equipment consists of 12 [...] one lorry, submachine guns, pr[...] weapons, communications equip[...] explosives and welding apparatus. Th[...] is always a helicopter available.

Asked about what is most imp[...] for SEK, Herr Wolfgram says: "[...] must get along with each other. I [...] know every one of my 49 comrad[es in]side out, I must be familiar with [...] strengths and their weaknesses.

"I must be able to rely on the [...]ing fire; I must be sure that I won't [...] hit in the process. You can't waste [a] single second thinking about mist[akes] the others might make."

Lower Saxony SEK has been invo[lved] in 70 missions since 1975. They inc[lud]ed the searching of trains for terror[ists], searching of homes, hostage-taking [...] and organised crime.

When they are not on duty with [...] SEK, they patrol by car.

The general principle is: two-th[...] plainclothes patrol work, and alert [...] the clock.

Being prepared for every conting[ency] means that SEK men have to be [...] car drivers.

Remembers Herr Wolfgram: "The [...] was that hostage-taking case in Ol[den]burg one January. It was freezing [...] and the streets were [...] up. The [heli]copter was out of action because of [...] dark. We had to drive our car for [...] was worth and the people who [...] must have thought that we were [...] kaze drivers. But we practise this [...] thing twice a week and are pretty [...] of ourselves."

He says little about the details of [...] mission. All he is prepared to say [...] the Oldenburg incident is that the [...] robber who took the hostages shot [him]self.

"In another case a group of big [...] pushers had barricaded themselves [...] farmhouse. It was hard to get at [...] because of the vicious dogs they [...] around the place.

"So we got a Customs dog ha[ndler] and his dog that was known for it[s fight]ing spirit. While the Customs [...] fought with the other dogs we [...] the house."

G. Besse[...]

(Die Welt, 29 May 1[980])

Former POW comes back from official death after 36 years

A 68-year-old man declared officially dead in 1973 has returned to Germany after an absence of 36 years. He is Wilhelm Dyck, a Silesian who was taken prisoner-of-war by the Russians.

He chose to stay in the Soviet Union after inquiries had revealed that his wife and family in Germany were dead. But this information was incorrect.

So was the story told his wife in Dachau, near Munich, who was informed in 1973 that her husband had been blown up by a landmine on the refugee trek in 1944.

But she wouldn't believe it and never abandoned hope. People returning from the Soviet Union had told her sister in Friedland refugee camp about a Wilhelm Dyck who was alive and well in the Urals.

For months her letters were unanswered. Her husband never received them. Then, in 1978, he wrote and she learnt that he was working in an engineering factory.

He had married again, a woman of German extraction, in 1963, but they had no children and his second wife died in 1977.

So after application procedures and the usual wait he and his first wife have been reunited in Dachau after 36 years.

dpa

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 20 May 1980)

The German Tribune

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West steers course of unity in Venice

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Summit diplomacy is in full swing. A week after the Venice summit of EEC heads of government, leaders of the seven major Western industrialised countries conferred in the Italian city.

Venice 2 was their sixth international economic summit and would in all probability have been a routine gathering with a prearranged publicity bonus for the leaders concerned.

But the course of world affairs rewrote the agenda to give pride of place to the post-Afghanistan situation.

For the four European participants, Britain, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, Venice was also a bid to coordinate policy with the United States.

Great store is invariably set by summit meetings. Chancellor Schmidt regularly reminds EEC summits that decisions are expected.

In point of fact, however, Herr Schmidt only really values the exchange of ideas that takes place at such gatherings. That, he feels, is what really counts.

Venice 2 was nonetheless more than a philosophical fireside chat. It should have been held five months ago to prevent the West from drawing varied conclusions from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

A high price has been paid for failure to do so. Seldom has the West been so disunited and created such an uncohesive impression at a critical juncture.

Each and every point of fracture that has arisen over the years has been laid bare with frightening clarity.

It was not merely a matter of whether Europe is right in its disappointment at President Carter's weak leadership or America is right in its annoyance at the seeming egoism of Europe's attitude.

What mattered first and foremost was that the Soviet Union might feel encouraged to undertake similar military ventures elsewhere.

Over Afghanistan the West has clearly failed to close ranks. Verbal condemnation of the Soviet invasion counts for little when there is no action in its wake.

So the task facing the West in Venice was to reconcile the different viewpoints, with a key role being allotted to Bonn.

France may go it alone and Britain promise the earth and fail to deliver, but these are shortcomings America is readier to tolerate than the merest suggestion of deviation from the Western policy line by Germany.

Given its economic potential, Bonn is regarded by Washington as the cornerstone of the Atlantic alliance in Western Europe, and more is expected of Bonn than of London or Paris.

At the same time no-one could have a keener interest in maintenance of the North Atlantic pact than Bonn. It is the basis of West Germany's very existence as it now stands.

So the success of Venice 2 depended on how well President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt came to terms, especially as it was no secret that their personal relationship left much to be desired.

In recent months there have been times when the impression was created that Bonn's tendency towards greater independence of the United States had something to do with this personal relationship.

Whatever the reasons may have been, the crucial factor is the impression that arises in the United States, and Bonn is currently under a cloud in America.

In the debate on a joint strategy towards the Soviet Union parts will be played by both the Nato decision to modernise medium-range nuclear missile potential in Europe and trade — trade with the Eastern block. The Nato missile modernisation decision, which has been the butt of Soviet attacks on the West, was a remarkable token of Nato's ability to act. But is has already been called into question. Belgium and Holland are trying to shelve their limited commitment to the joint decision. Italy might also be tempted if any weakening of the stand were to become apparent. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt must make it clear in his talks with President Jimmy Carter in Venice that the Federal Republic of Germany intends to remain firmly behind the Nato decision, so that America can take reassurance from this solidarity.

Official declarations in the run-up to the Venice summit having sounded an aggrieved note at times, the course of the talks themselves was rendered none the easier.

It remains to be seen how the new US view of the overall situation is to be reconciled with Western Europe's wish for business as usual (as far as possible, that is) in trade with the Eastern bloc.

The United States has grave misgivings about Soviet intentions, and Western efforts to boost defence potential and offset Soviet arms superiority in a number of sectors are continually undermined by this trade.

European policy has a split personality, and this is an issue on which it is unmistakeably apparent.

Heinz Stadlmann

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 21 June 1980)

The German Tribune Magazine is included with this issue.



Appointment in Venice: The attention of Chancellor Schmidt is briefly caught as he shares a relaxed moment with President Carter and Secretary of State Muskie. In the background is the US national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Photo: dpa)



King Khaled of Saudi Arabia is welcomed to Bonn by President Karl Carstens. (Photo: Hans Windeck)

Saudi Arabia's King Khaled visits Bonn

Not for nothing did Bonn welcome King Khaled of Saudi Arabia with the greatest respect. Chancellor Schmidt was not just being polite when he thanked the King for the responsible oil price policies pursued by Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia is not only the foremost oil exporter but also Bonn's major supplier, meeting a quarter of Germany's petroleum import requirements.

So King Khaled's visit to Bonn and West Berlin was much more than a fairytale or picturesque interlude. Very real political issues were involved.

Saudi Arabia does not just want to sell oil; it is also on the lookout for useful economic cooperation in industrial development.

The petrodollars Riyadh holds are a powerful incentive, and not just for the DM2.5bn loan Bonn recently raised in Saudi Arabia.

In view of unrest in the region, Iran and Afghanistan being cases in point, the political importance of Saudi Arabia has assumed vital significance for both Bonn, Europe and the West as a whole.

Saudi Arabia is felt to be indispensable as a reliable partner and a factor for order in the Gulf.

As a number of difficulties arise in connection with the Middle East and the future of Israel, diplomatic skill is called for in cooperation between Bonn and Riyadh.

The two countries were no more on the same wavelength than were President Carter and King Hussein of Jordan in Washington, but both encounters testify to the West's need to intensify its dialogue with the Arab world.

They also show that Arab moderates are banking on the West in view of the Soviet threat to the region. So King Khaled's visit to Bonn can also be considered an auspicious occasion.

Hans Stollhans

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 19 June 1980)

■ FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Attempting to define a US identity

The American Aspen Institute held a three-day session of discussions between American and European politicians in Berlin. These discussion are normally useful, although something of a luxury. But at the present time, they seem almost necessary. The Institute director, Shephard Stone, invariably thoughtful, prudent and good-humoured, this time persuaded John McCloy to attend. McCloy was the last High Commissioner of the US zone of occupation from 1949 to 1952 and one of the principal figures behind the Marshall Plan. He is a symbol of German-American relations.

The United States is going though an identity crisis. But the crisis is not a new one.

Its ambitions are to be not only the biggest power on earth but also the best, the nation which could impart the richness of its ideals to others.

And this was called into question a quarter of a century ago, when the Hungarians had to fight alone their vain fight for freedom.

The United States and its foreign policy was the subject of this Aspen Institute meeting in Berlin.

The magazine US *News and World Report* says in a recent editorial: "This is the test time for Americans. We are facing an international attack ... aimed at eroding the image of the United States, presenting good as bad and bas as good and turning not only our vices, but also our virtues, against us."

A giant surrounded and confused by a pack of dwarves? This was not the impression given by the American speakers at the Aspen Institute discussions.

But it was noticeable that they too were unable to answer all the questions about America today. On the contrary, it was they who asked these questions most persistently.

We were told, for example, that since 1960 the Wasp (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) element in American life, for so long the dominant shaping force, has been losing influence. But this is nothing new to the student of American affairs.

The other point frequently made was that money now seemed to be the only motivation — a criticism which sounds more like a general criticism of the age than an explanation of the specific American malaise now.

So there was little at the discussions to satisfy our curiosity about symptoms of this shift of cultural dominance in the USA — especially as, almost inevitably in such forums, most of the American participants came from the traditional elites.

We were on firmer ground when a competent German analyst referred to the United States' economic difficulties. The strength or weakness of the dollar are connected with the United States' political power.

Inflation means weakening of economic power and therefore of power *per se*.

What worried most political observers was that the rate of savings in most American households was far lower than in France, Japan and West Germany.

At this point, however, purely economic analysis reaches its limits: beyond that comes the speculative sphere of sociology. What makes the individual American act in this way? To what extent have they turned their backs on the solid principles of the Puritan protestant immigrants which for so long dominated their economic thinking? The only sure thing is that this too weakens the world power.


There are clear inadequacies in the Soviet economic system which correspond to the obvious weaknesses of the United States' economy, but the Soviet Union is tremendously rich in energy and raw materials.

Despite its weak economy, the Soviet Union can keep pace with the United States militarily by concentrating on this area. Its export surplus, even with West Germany, confirms this. According to the CIA, the Soviet Union's energy reserves are such that it does not need to press forward rapidly to the Persian Gulf to meet its energy requirements.

The danger in the view of many experts is that the Soviet Union is now in positions of superiority in a number of areas — more so than at any time in the last five years perhaps — and that it might be tempted to take maximum advantage of this position.

The study of current American weaknesses is a very wide-ranging subject. Perhaps, on closer contemplation, some remarks by American politicians can be revealing.

We have only recently begun to realise that democracy is an ideal to which even Athenian and English democracy only approximated. American democra-



cy, too, relies to a large extent on the fact that a good many citizens only participate passively — not even voting.

But the new process of democratisation means that the rank and file want to have a far greater say. Congress has more than 300 committees and subcommittees on this and that; and there are more projects for laws than there are days in the year.

Courts are overburdened with civil rights cases: "Every group wants to have its rights confirmed." This affects politics.


The Americans are moving nearer to democratic ideals — and the price is a sapping of the country's strength as a world power.

Here reality under the aegis of the American constitution has prospered more than we may notice from afar. The aim, as one participant said, was to rewrite the unwritten constitution of the United States. No one disputed this.

In terms of political culture American does not seem to be becoming more "exotic" to us. And the fact that social security is the fastest-growing item in the American budget also indicates a move towards a European system. Or, to put it differently, some of the pecularities which helped give America its political and economic strength are being levelled out.

As America itself does not know where its inner changes are leading it, it has become more difficult to predict for its friends and its allies.

But, despite its economic weakness at



Seeking answers: John McCloy (left) and Aspen Institute director Shephard Sto[ne] (Photo: Rob[illegible])

the moment, no one now says, as they did after the Vietnam War, that America is sick: Rather they are waiting for the re-appearance of American strength.

The basic confidence is there, but the details are more problematic. At the Aspen Institute discussions, attended not only by parliamentarians but also by unofficial advisers to the government leaderships, the difficulties become clear.

Semi-officially, complaints were made that contacts between Schmidt and Carter were minimal compared to those between Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, who met 12 times in the space of a year.

After the Afghanistan crisis, no one in Europe picked up a phone and asked: can I just come over for talks?

Reduced to the simplest level, a certain historical aspect has become apparent in relations between Europe and the USA. Things have not been as they were recently.

In these talks between West Germans, Americans, French and English it became apparent that on one point the Germans are closer to the Americans than others, on another rather further.

The point of greater closeness was Nato, which, it was said, was better than its reputation and could not exist without the Federal Republic of Germany: the Soviet Union had nothing to offer West Germany which could induce it to leave Nato and conversely West Germany had nothing to offer the Soviet Union.

The Americans were told, though, that the left of the SPD regarded Nato as an alliance and no more, without sentiment. Assessments among Germans differed here.

The greatest difference between the West German and the American points of view seemed to be on Afghanistan, where the Germans insisted on seeing Afghanistan as a matter for the two super-powers.

A British participant did not see things in such stark terms: a division of labour to preserve the balance at the Persian Gulf was conceivable, he said.

The Americans regarded Nato as something more than just the protection of central Europe. The divergence of interests was evident. If the Soviet Union does not change its policies, pressure on West Germany to play a part in global defence will increase.

It has argued that it is already playing a part in this defence by its financial aid to Turkey, but this will not be considered enough.

The West Germans say that they take the shift in the balance of power in the Middle East very seriously, but that there is a difference between recognising this fact and immediately acting on it.

This puts the finger on the sore point: the West's real capacity to act. For democratic reasons, it is no longer prepared to intervene, and its political ethics bar the way to a policy of [illegible] though.

Furthermore it is not, or no[t] equipped to carry out such action[s] the working out at a joint strat[egy] "prevention, not intervention" [illegible] recipe.

Here, however, Nato in its p[resent] form is being asked to do more th[an it] is able to cope with. For the first [time] the interests of all members are [illegible]tered by events outside the narrow[ly] defined Nato territory.

Of course it is also the first time th[at] a conflict is taking place between [the] Soviet Union and the Third World.

These are questions on which o[pin]ions diverge greatly and that of co[urse] affects German-American realtions.

The French, too, see Europe as fac[ed] with a choice between voluntary Fi[nlan]disation and sticking to Nato. They [ad]vocate the idea of a *directoire*, an ide[a of] de Gaulle. In a previous Aspen dis[cus]sion, before Afghanistan, an Ame[rican] put forward the idea of directori[es] but changing ad hoc directories [illegible] from Washington.

What the French mean is a director[y] consisting of representatives from Was[h]hington, Tokyo, Paris, London a[nd] Bonn. As an institution this has [illegible] chance, because of the fears of the [smal]ler members.

In principle the West Germans w[ould] have nothing against the idea of a di[rec]tory, but there are considerations wh[ich] go against it: "A directory is fine as lo[ng] as it is not described as such."

The French proposal is positive i[n] that it indicates a willingness to act [illegible] act decisively to create a second pillar [of] the Atlantic Treaty. The idea of a [illegible] force is also rejected by the Germ[ans] and, despite appearances, by the Fre[nch] too.

John McCloy, who was born in 18[illegible] told the forum that he had [lived] through 40 per cent of the history [of] the United States.

McCloy's appearance underlined [the] special nature of this session. [These] were discussions preceding decisio[ns].

Continued on page 3

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■ THE GENERAL ELECTION

Strauss or Schmidt a choice of personalities as never before

[E]lection year party-political conferences are over and done with, manifestos have been approved and, for the most part, already forgotten.

Party leaders have been presented to the faithful and dutifully applauded. Parties represented in the Bundestag have taken up position for the campaign run-[illegible]

The first and most striking conclusion to be reached is that even for an election campaign this choice this time is to staggering extent one of personalities.

There have, of course, been many dramatic choices of personality put before the electorate in the Federal Republic of Germany in the past.

Voters have been asked to choose between Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Shumacher, between Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt and between Willy Brandt and Rainer Barzel.

But never before has the choice of leader been so consistently labelled the choice at issue in the election campaign.

The Social Democrats, albeit at times with gnashing of teeth, are hailing Helmut Schmidt's Chancellorship as a blessing to man and casting Shadow Chancellor Franz Josef Strauss as the menace to end all menaces.

The Free Democrats too, long though they may have sought not to follow suit, have been left with no choice but to cast their leader, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as a third crucial figure in the game.

Christian Democrats, on the other hand, do not uniformly feel their candidate to be a blessing. They have certainly felt the need to bolster his effect on the voting public by casting him as one of a team, a Shadow Cabinet squad.

Was the intention to enhance his prospects to the north of his home base, Bavaria, or to prevent him from laying the blame on others or from shirking responsibility altogether? It is hard to say.

In view of this emphasis on personalities, the Christian Democrats were left with no choice but to attack Chancellor Schmidt in person.

Yet this runs counter to the conviction of a majority who feel confident in Herr Schmidt and lack confidence in Herr Strauss. In both cases they seem fairly sure of their views and are unlikely to change them in a matter of months.

The second conclusion must be that polarisation has, at first glance, reached an extent unusual for West Germany.

There have ben times when programmatic alternatives have been presented to the country in dramatic terms, as in the early post-war years when the economic set-up and integration as a member of the West were still controversial issues.

In 1972, for that matter, the choice was presented in drastic terms as one either for or against Bonn's treaties with the East bloc countries.

But never has the choice been framed in such radical and comprehensive terms as by Herr Strauss this time round, as a frontal attack on so-called socialism.

Abroad the socialism he pillories is said to lead to capitulation to the Communists, while at home it allegedly leads to the destruction of constitutional freedoms.

The Shadow Chancellor calls for a virtually revolutionary change in government policies. The Bonn coalition, especially the Social Democrats, counter-claim that Herr Strauss falls short in his capacity for peace.

This is an accusation that appeals simultaneously to calm common sense and to anxious reluctance to consider change of any kind. It is an attempt to bring about polarisation less via political content than via political method, Herr Strauss being used to personify a method.

This polarisation makes it virtually impossible for the Free Democrats to don the mantle of an independent third force. By the same token the liberal wing of the Christian Democrats has virtually been obliterated in the dispute.

In the midst of a general election campaign the country is once more clearly split down the middle into two camps.

The third finding is that foreign policy holds pride of place. Everyone is at odds over peace policy, with the Christian Democrats still on the defensive.

They have yet to explain why their policy not only does not jeopardise the peace but is the better means of keeping it.

Free Democrat Herr Genscher has reformulated his foreign policy articles of faith in view of the impact the issue has assumed and of his party's requirements.

He may not have changed his tune on any major issue but views shared with the Opposition are hardly in evidence any more. He too is banking on peace policy.

All other issues pale in significance in comparison with the basics of foreign policy. Home affairs in any real sense of the term no longer count.

Even financial and fiscal policies, which might soonest be expected to open up a second campaign front, are explained to a large extent in foreign policy terms.

What shape must, for instance, the financial set-up take if Bonn is to meet its burgeoning international commitments?

It would appear only normal for the country to be divided more starkly into opposing camps at election time, but it is doubtful whether the current polarisation is normal and whether it is in keeping with the state of the parties, the current scope for political activity and the inclinations of the electorate.

A large number of Christian Democrats consider Herr Strauss's line, that of the radical alternative, to be mistaken and inappropriate.

There may have been little sign of differences of opinion among Christian Democrats on campaign policies but that is because, for the most part, the manifesto was negotiated behind closed doors as a coalition agreement between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Herr Strauss's Christian Social Union (CSU).

Their respective party conferences were instructed to approve the terms or else, unlike the Free Democrats, who differed on policy even on the brink of possible annihilation at the polls.

They, at least, cannot be said to have fitted like a glove into their own coalition arrangements. Free Democrat left-wingers outstrip their Social Democrat counterparts by far in anticipation of emancipation.

At the Free Democrats' election year conference in Freiburg left-wingers gained approval of a number of demands that may be deemed unsatisfactory.

Economic liberals, on the other hand, led by the Free Democratic Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff, defend views that would have difficulty in finding majority support even among Christian Democrats.

Last not least, the Social Democrats have shown discipline in following the Chancellor's enlightened "decisionism," which has proved so successful. But some find it difficult to identify entirely with it.

The Chancellor has not made it easy for them to do so. Herr Strauss and Herr Genscher have appealed to their respective parties' emotions and called on the rank-and-file to close ranks. Not so Herr Schmidt.

He has cast himself in the role of a statesman for all, a level-headed politician who is capable of reading his fellow-Social Democrats the Riot Act even at an election campaign party conference.

This move was doubtless made to draw a distinction between himself and the blood and thunder of Herr Strauss, but there can be no denying that there has yet to be a Bonn Chancellor to play the part of statesmanlike impartiality to such perfection.

To contradict him is to run the risk of being accused of casting common sense to the winds. On this point the Chancellor no longer makes distinctions between political parties.

Comparison with past election year party-political conferences, it is strikingly apparent that the parties seem to regard the current campaign more than ever as a set figure.

The Free Democrats are the sole exception to this rule, and for them survival is the issue at stake. Despite personalisation and polarisation the tension and excitement are low-key.

There are two main reasons why. First, the election campaign has been under way virtually ever since Herr Strauss was nominated as Opposition candidate for the Chancellorship.

Herr Strauss has remained the main issue at stake, but no-one has anything original to say any more about either him or his strategy.

Besides, his political pulling-power has been put to the test and found somewhat wanting in two recent state assembly elections, in the Saar and in North Rhine-Westphalia.

The general election already seems predestined to repeat this decision by the electorate. The only factor that seems at all likely to upset the ruling coalition's applecart is (or would be) a feeling that the outcome is a foregone conclusion.

The Social Democrats are right to warn against such levity, but what really concerns the parties at this stage of the proceedings is what the position is likely to be after the poll is over.

The Social and Free Democrats are wondering how they may be able to cope with ever tougher government tasks, while the CDU/CSU is wondering how it will overcome its bid for power with Herr Strauss at the helm.

It would be a miracle if voters were unaware that this is what currently concerns the parties. The Christian Democrats seem resigned. The Social Democrats appear cool, calm and collected.

Voters appreciate that the election is important but, at least for the moment, they remain unconvinced that it is likely to hold forth much promise of excitement.

Second, the current polarisation is only accepted by part of the public. It is, after all, not convincingly acted out. It is hard to say which is truer of Herr Strauss: his verbal radicalism or his practical circumspection, which verges on relative inability to take decisions.

True enough, it is difficult to formulate a radical counter-position to Helmut Schmidt, a statesman who at times sounds a somewhat schoolmasterly note.

He talks in terms of duties, common sense and facts and tends to reduce alternatives to the dictates of common sense. It is hard to pillory him as a hod-carrier for the Socialists.

He, unlike Herr Strauss, is not a focus of polarisation. The impression he conveys is more one of integration, and it is, moreover, an integration that enjoys the support of many Christian Democrats.

Last but not least, party leaders know (and the public sense) that political leeway is strictly limited — much more so than manifestos would lead one to believe.

The Common Market decision to underwrite easier terms for Mrs Thatcher has hammered home the message that domestic reforms, if they are to cost anything, can only be implemented via higher taxes.

There are no more increases to be shared out. Bonn must count itself lucky if enough cash is around to bankroll foreign policy commitments. In practical foreign policy terms the times have long since passed when election campaigners could argue in terms of "either or."

This doesn't, by any stretch of the imagination, mean that problems have lessened. It is by no means easier to keep the domestic, social peace when the cupboard is bare.

It has grown no easier to redefine Bonn's foreign policy role in terms of greater responsibility either.

There will, no doubt, be little mention of this in campaign slogans. This time round the campaign really does seem more like a dutiful exercise than ever.

Politicians and the public are, it would seem, duty [illegible] perform it until such time [illegible] but hope the political debate is resumed in earnest [illegible]

Rolf Zundel

(Die Zeit, 13 June 1980)

Continued from page 2

[Bo]th sides of the Atlantic, the leaders [har]bour doubts about the reliability of [th]eir partners.

Signs of an always latent popular anti-Americanism are visible in Europe [n]ow.

The Soviet Union is now perhaps at the zenith of its power and would like to perpetuate this state of affairs. It has a huge superiority in conventional arms.

"Some seem to believe that the time for the use of the military instrument is past. This is an illusion," said a West German.

More than ever before, the West must [st]op and reflect.

And on this there was general agreement: a new, long-term strategy must [n]ow be devised.

Robert Held

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 June 1980)

■ PROFILE

Stoltenberg to be deputy if Strauss wins

Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, has agreed to be Franz Josef Strauss' deputy if Strauss is elected Chancellor on October 5.

The decision was greeted with relief by Stoltenberg's friends both in Bonn and the *Länder*, who were waiting for him to enter the election fray.

But they are thinking not so much of election itself as of the period after it — in case Strauss fails and a new debate on the leadership takes place.

Gerhard Stoltenberg is no friend of simple judgements, especially when he himself is concerned.

"I have no definite career plans" he assures his visitor with great composure, probably to underline that he is not consumed by ambition and chasing after the highest offices.

Besides, it would run counter to his cool, north German temperament if he were to broadcast advances in his career with promises and assurances.

Stoltenberg has never been one to shoot from the hip. His mottos are caution and avoidance of all imponderable risks. When he is not absolutely sure of something, he prefers to keep silent; and even when he has got everything clearly worked out in his head, he always talks moderately.

SPD floor-leader Herbert Wehner once mockingly described Stoltenberg as *der große Klare aus dem Norden*.

However, on closer contemplation, Stoltenberg's friends could find nothing derogatory about this description — indeed they found it very apt and unintentionally positive.

They thus transformed Wehner's jibe into testimony to the clearheadedness and straightforwardness of their *Land* Prime Minister in Kiel.

Stoltenberg's decision to join the Strauss election team in spite of previous reassurances that he would be staying in Schleswig-Holstein and not taking up a ministerial post in Bonn is a direct consequence of the CDU/CSU's election defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Most of the opposition regarded this as a defeat for Strauss, a result of the anti-Strauss campaign.

When in July last year Franz Josef Strauss was elected CDU/CSU Shadow Chancellor the only prominent north German politician on whose support he could rely was Lower Saxony Finance Minister Walther Leisler Kiep — despite their differences.

Land Prime Minister Stoltenberg and Albrecht, neither of whom had shown any enthusiasm for Strauss's candidacy, conspicuously held back — Stoltenberg because he had promised the people of Schleswig-Holstein before the election that he would remain in Kiel and Albrecht because he wanted to be Shadow Chancellor or nothing.

However, the defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia was a severe blow to the Opposition. The disappointing result underlined the danger that the Opposition might face a similar defeat on October 5 followed by an unending slump.

To reduce the undeniable effect of the anti-Strauss campaign and to prevent a mood of defeatism gripping the party, the CDU executive argued strongly for the election team to be announced long before the election.

When the team was announced a fortnight ago, Gerhard Stoltenberg was given particular prominence.

Stoltenberg says that the short-term aim is, if not election victory, then at least a respectable election result which would banish the danger of a split in the Opposition ranks such as nearly occured when the CSU threatened to break away in Wildbad Kreuth in autumn 1976.

But Stoltenberg's prominence in the election team will also of course have long-term effects. If the CDU/CSU loses, then in accordance with the party's ruthless practice Strauss will be toppled.

His fate would be the same as that of Kurt Georg Kiesinger 11 years ago and Rainer Barzel and Helmut Kohl since.

Stoltenberg does not disguise his distaste when he talks of previous procedures in the CDU/CSU for appointing people to the highest offices.


The thought that this could happen again obviously appals him. Of course, as in the past, the problem of double leadership would have to be discussed, the question of who was to hold the highest posts — party leader, Opposition leader, Shadow Chancellor — or whether they should all be held by one man.

But Stoltenberg believes that these debates would only be fruitful if in future they were held without confrontation.

"The policies and leadership of the CDU/CSU have priority. And positions must be filled in accordance with these priorities. Kohl, Albrecht, Stoltenberg — that is not for me to decide."

And to remove all doubts about the strictness of this maxim, he also provides the instructions for use. "I am not saying this and do not intend it as a tactical argument."

If Helmut Schmidt wins the election, Stoltenberg would undoubtedly play a



far greater part in national politics than he has done to date.

Stoltenberg faced a similar decision five years ago. In spring of 1975, he enjoyed strong support in the CDU/CSU. Leading politicians from north and south would have preferred him as Shadow Chancellor to Helmut Kohl.

But when, in the Schleswig-Holstein Land election, he won by only one seat he appeared before the TV cameras pale as chalk.

Had he won convincingly, the Shadow Chancellorship would have fallen into his lap, but all his hopes were shattered.

Kohl, the beaming victor in the Rhineland Palatinate *Land* election and party leader, was soon afterwards elected Shadow Chancellor.

Stoltenberg did not commit himself very strongly to Kohl's election campaign, much to the disappointment of his political friends.

But this did not affect his reputation. As deputy CDU leader and party spokesman on finance and economic and energy problems he managed, even in remote Schleswig-Holstein, to avoid the fate of many *Land* Prime Ministers of sinking into comfortable obscurity in high office.

Stoltenberg has been an MP for 25 years, for four years he was Bonn Minister of Research, for 11 years *Land* Prime Minister. This experience now stands him in good stead. For every eventuality in the foreseeable future, Stoltenberg has the best chances of replacing Strauss as Shadow Chancellor.



United in Opposition: Stoltenberg (left) and Strauss. (Photo: Sven S...)

Stoltenberg's mastery of his field — finance and economics — is highly thought of, even in the Bonn coalition. He seems to be systematically reducing his gaps in knowledge of foreign poliy — not by political tourism but by hard work.

No one doubts his capacity for leadership, making full use of his right to lay down the guidelines of policy. Wherever intellectual lucidity, hard work and clear judgement are required, Stoltenberg can be relied on to perform brilliantly.

On the other hands, he has no trace of charisma or even talent for moving speeches or fascinating presentation of ideas. At meetings people listen to him carefully and believe what he says but they hardly jump from their seats with enthusiasm.

Stoltenberg is an advocate of consensus democracy, not of confrontation, a liberal conservative who, by his stolidity and thoroughness, can influence the political centre — unlike Strauss.

And finally he is credited with the ability to persuade the Free Democrats to join a coalition. It is difficult to imagine affairs and scandals under his leadership.

For all these reasons, Stoltenberg enjoys great confidence in his party. From him the party expects a positive impulse north of the Main line especially — where, as the North Rhine-Westphalia result shows, the CDU is most in danger of losing votes.

Strauss has said that if he wins the election, he will appoint Stoltenberg Vice-Chancellor and make him responsible for economics and finance. This is the field in which Stoltenberg wants to concentrate his attacks on the Bonn coalition.

"Despite his great political competence, Helmut Schmidt is virtually neglecting the task of leadership," he says.

He criticises the fact that there was no change of course in financial policy, although the need for this was clear to everyone after the outbreak of the Afghanistan crisis.

Everyone knew, he says, that more would now have to be spent on foreign and defence policy. Stoltenberg wonders why Schmidt did not respond to the depressed mood of the people at the beginning of the year and explain the necessity for greater savings.

Instead, Bonn passed laws on noise abatement, youth assistance and other things which will place a burden of billions of DM on the *Länder*.

Stoltenberg says that the Brussels EEC compromise on the reduction of the United Kingdom's contributions and Bonn's inability to cut the cost of this from the current budget are wa[rning] signs.

Stoltenberg suspects that the Bonn Government will use the promised reductions — as compensation for the EEC decision — also as a means of pressuring the *Länder* into giving it a larger share of tax income.

Another criticism is that Bonn is not doing enough to reduce the level of government debt, especially as the prospects for high growth rates are minimal.

What makes this in his opinion extra serious is that the SPD itself is divided on the issue. One group insists on the need for growth; the other is increasingly sceptical about this.

Stoltenberg considers it "unfortunate in the circumstances that the SPD has committed itself to the 35-hour week." He says that this is an acceptable goal for women and older workers but not for all workers.

He said the 35-hour week had nothing to do with social progress. If introduced, it would mean an increase in wage costs. This would hamper exports and cause great difficulties for medium-sized firms.

The highly successful Japanese, he says, work four weeks a year more than we do. He accused the Chancellor of doing nothing about these developments, despite his better judgement.

Stoltenberg's second line of attack is on energy policies. "I see no signs whatever of the Bonn government going ahead with a consistent programme for expanding atomic energy."

Bonn, he said, talked of coal liquefaction as an alternative to atomic energy knowing perfectly well that development costs would amount to billions of DM not planned for in the budget.

In foreign and defence policy, Stoltenberg wants to see the CDU/CSU stressing the importance of German-American relations.

He is worried about a new form of anti-Americanism and "count... mentality" on the left. He said the CDU/CSU would have to make greater efforts to combat this attitude by presenting its ideas on peace and freedom more effectively.

Stoltenberg sees glaring weaknesses in the SPD in financial policy, atomic energy and Nato policy.

He says: "The great strength of the Opposition in the really central questions, by which I mean Nato, energy and financial policy, is that it is united and capable of action. It is not split by internal disputes like the SPD."

Kurt Becker

(Die Zeit, 13 June 1980)

■ INTRA-GERMAN AFFAIRS

Day of Unity a misnomer with uncomfortable memories

The public holiday on June 17 which is known as the German Day of Unity is still a day of discomfort.

Its name is not even correct. The German nation is not united and is not likely to be in the foreseeable future.

Nor do we have any reason to "celebrate" the Day of Unity. After all, what is there to celebrate in memory of an abortive uprising of German workers (in East Berlin on June 17, 1953) that was brutally put down with tanks and accelerated the East-West rift in central Europe?

Let us not forget that there is a link between the 1953 freedom demonstration and the sealing off of the GDR with the Wall that country built in 1961. The discomfort is not new. The political consensus after the 1953 uprising was short-lived, and the disputes over the meaningfulness of this holiday were stepped up — but not because of lack of respect for the aims and the victims of the uprising.

They were stepped up because we found it increasingly difficult from year to year to arrive at a political interpretation of this day.

The many committees that were to decide whether to keep or abolish the public holiday led to nothing. What remained can best be called pangs of conscience. An abortive liberation attempt in which we West Germans had no part anyway was turned into a paid holiday while over there in the other Germany people have to work as on any other day. Small wonder, then, that attempts to abolish the holiday have been made time and again (some want to have it replaced by the day commemorating the proclamation of our Constitution).

But the reasons in favour of retention have gained the upper hand.

We need gestures and symbols if we are to perpetuate the idea of unity. Without them and without such a commemorative day, we would have to worry even more about cities like Jena and Wittenberg disappearing forever in the remoteness of a foreign state.

Even so, there are also sound and honest political arguments in favour of abolition.

When June 17 was proclaimed a public holiday our politicians and their parties (be it rightly or wrongly) were still imbued with the hope of reunification.

Little by little, this hope has been replaced by the realisation that the two Germanies must come to some political arrangement.

The German question cannot be solved by majority decision and even less by force.

Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* and its *Deutschlandpolitik* under Brandt and Scheel (from 1969 onwards) were marked by the realisation that it is necessary to recognise the existence of a second German state and to pursue a diplomacy of patience and small steps.

As a result, the word "reunification" disappeared from the political vocabulary in Bonn.

This being so, the Day of Unity is even more out of keeping with the political realities of the past 10 years. Instead, we now cautiously speak of a "possible future order" or of an imagineable "eventual reunification".

The fact that such a reunification is immeasurably distant is reflected in the reticence of our vocabulary.

The same applies to the theory of "two German states of one nation". This phrase was a handy formula for the new *Deutschlandpolitik* that was aimed at recognising the other Germany. It replaced the previous denial of the existence of such a state.

Chancellor Kiesinger still referred to the GDR as a "phenomenon".

The formula of a nation divided into two states made it easier to pursue a *Deutschlandpolitik* aimed at détente.

There is a long and impressive list of improvements in the relations between the people on both sides of the Wall — improvements which were only possible through the recognition of the GDR.

For instance, the annual volume of trade between the two has risen to DM10bn. Travelling has been simplified, and the number of visitors from the Federal Republic of Germany has risen to more than 3m a year.

And instead of the former one million there are now ten million phone calls between the two. The number of repatriates (including those whose freedom was bought for cash) has risen.

The list of improvements also includes official and unofficial visits back and forth and the ability of West German correspondents to report from the GDR — which the regime there tolerates with much gnashing of teeth.

All this is much more than we would have dared hope for 10 years ago. It would be unfair to permit the chicanery and repression in the other Germany to obscure our view of the many little gains that have been made with patient diplomacy.

By the same token, we must admit to ourselves that all these improvements have done nothing to promote unity.

Is the thesis of the unity of the nation not as much as in danger of paling as was the thesis of a reunification in peace and freedom?

The GDR has already deleted the term "German nation" from its constitution, and it adamantly denies that there is such a thing as two states of a German nation.

Helmut Schmidt once said that the nation retains its right to self determination for as long as the will to be a nation lasts.

But does our nation still want to be a nation? Does it want unity with the same passion with which the Jews or the Poles have striven for nationhood?

Our Constitution calls on the people to "bring about the unity of Germany"; buth how many of our schoolchildren know where the Saale River is?

History has denied us the comfort of demonstrating that a divided nations is unnatural. Past centuries saw the disintegration of the German empire as parts of it seceded and in their turn became nations with a history of their own.

In the same way, the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany could one day become nations in their own right.

The useful formula of two states and one nation need not last forever. Nationhood is not a condition but a process of change.

Are we still a nation? Perhaps we have already ceased being the German nation — both here and there.

Bernd Nellessen

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 14 June 1980)

Arrested visitors in the GDR: case for a discreet Mission

One of the main functions of Bonn's Permanent Mission to East Berlin is looking after West Germans and West Berliners imprisoned in the GDR.

Details of work with prisoners and progress in this field are outlined in a report handed to the Bundestag Committee for Intra-German Relations by Günter Gaus, the Mission head.

The report is dominated by the hope that improvements in German-German relations can be made by cautious, step-by-step diplomacy.

At present, the Mission looks after 306 prisoners — a gratifying figure considering that there were 500 in 1977.

The reduction in the number of prisoners is largely due to discreet efforts to achieve their premature release and to the diminishing number of arrests in connection with transit traffic (1978: 124; 1979: 78).

The reason for these arrests is largely a legal provision peculiar only to the GDR, i.e. "aiding and abetting people intent on fleeing the Republic".

The GDR terms such activities "anti-state trade in human cargo".

Another reason for arrests is "illegal entry into the GDR". According to the Mission, almost all of these cases involve "careless or panic actions, frequently under the influence of alcohol."

The GDR officially informs the Mission of arrests of West German citizens if these took place in connection with transit traffic to Berlin. The time lag is usually three to four days.

However, the Mission is dissatisfied with the GDR procedure on arrests of travellers visiting the GDR. Information of this type frequently takes up to two weeks, and the Mission is working hard to shorten it.

Mission representatives may visit West Germans in prison. But the time lag between filing an application and receiving a visitor's pass is still too long (rarely less than four weeks).

Thirty staff members share the visiting. As a rule, their visit, the prisoner's first contact with the outside world, takes place in a special visiting room at the prison operated by the State Security Service in Berlin-Lichtenberg.

A member of the Security Service or a public prosecutor is always present.

There are two things the Mission can do for a prisoner: it can look after his personal affairs (informing next-of-kin and employer, drafting powers of attorney and arranging social welfare where necessary).

It can also try to improve conditions of imprisonment. Such contacts have frequently resulted in marked improvements.

Prisoners short of money are given some cash by the Mission so they can make purchases in prison. Every time a Mission member visits a prisoner he hands over a parcel with tobacco, fruit, toilet articles, etc, worth DM30.

The Mission has had little success in attempts to obtain permission to attend trials.

Once sentence has been passed, Mission members may again visit the prisoner.

According to the report, "prison conditions vary greatly for a centralistic regime like the GDR."

The new Prison Act of May 5 1977 has had a positive effect, says the report, even though not all improvements provided for in the Act have been implemented. Some were realised and then rescinded again.

Before, next-of-kin were only permitted to visit singly for 30 minutes once every three months. Now, up to two people may visit once every other month and spend one hour with the prisoner.

Before, prisoners were permitted to write two letters a month to their families and now they may write three.

Before, they had no legal claim to receiving parcels; now they may receive up to four a year. They may also borrow or buy books and magazines.

Herr Gaus would like to negotiate the right of prisoners to receive West German newspapers and listen to West German radio. His first tentative steps in this direction seem promising.

The GDR is evidently not trying to re-educate these prisoners but it does expect them to "conform to prison routine without objection or reservation."

Those who go along are usually left in peace.

Prisoners have to work and are paid 120 marks a month.

Many are sick, and many suffer psychologically to the point of being no longer fit for prison.

The report states the reason: "The prisoners are at the mercy of an alien social system which they reject they are cut off from their accustomed environment by more than just prison walls.

"Most have been sentenced for acts which, in our legal system, are neither criminal nor wrong. Moreover, the sentences are disproportionately stiff, so that the prisoner must feel that he is being punished in lieu of the Federal Republic of Germany."

Nine of the prisoners cared for by the Mission are lifers; 23 are serving 15-year terms; 30 are in for 10 to 14 years and 106 for five to nine years; 51 are serving sentences of less than five years.

The charges, according to the GDR, areß 56.8 per cent "aiding and abetting people intent on fleeing the Republic"; 11.7 per cent "espionage"; 3.4 per cent "traffic offences"1 15.1 per cent "border violations" and 5.6 per cent "violations of customs and foreign exchange regulations".

Bonn hopes that the extremely difficult negotiations on a legal aid agreement with the GDR (the difficulty lies in the question of German citizenship) will, at least indirectly, lead to some improvements of the prisoners' lot and, perhaps, reduce their number.

Helmut Herles

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 June 1980)

■ INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Court confirms legitimacy of the lockout as an employers' weapon

The Federal Labour Relations Court has ruled that lockouts as a countermeasure to selective strikes are permissible. The court headed by the presiding judge, Professor Gerhard Müller, held that, for reasons of equality, employers must have the necessary weapons with which to defend themselves in certain circumstances.

The Federal Labour Relations Court has now passed its third ruling on the legality of lockouts. And for the third time it confirmed them as legitimate measures in labour disputes.

But this third ruling is the most important of the three because it does not concern mini disputes involving very small groups of workers.

The ruling dealt with the 1978 industrial action in Baden-Württemberg's metal industry where employers locked out 146,000 workers in retaliation for a strike by 104,000.

The ruling also dealt with the industrial action in the printing industry where the employers responded to selective strikes by 2,281 workers in four companies with a nation-wide lockout of 32,735 people in 327 companies.

The printing industry said this was a war of annihilation. The doggedness with which the unions have been fighting against lockouts must be seen in historic dimensions.

In the early days of our industrial society, strikes were the only weapon workers had in their fight for better working conditions.

Strikers were frequently beaten up by police and army while employers defended themselves with lockouts. It was not until the mid-1920s that labour disputes developed into compromises rather than confrontations.

But the danger of confrontation grew again as the unions developed new strike methods in the form of selective strikes to save strike money and the employers reacted with lockouts. Such action was reminiscent of the early days of industrial action.

The latest ruling by the Federal Labour Relations Court is a milestone of labour relations legislation and social policy in the more than 100-year history of industrial action. It is a Solomon-like ruling which will both satisfy and irritate both parties.

Those who believed that the court would ban lockouts were wrong in their assessment of our society.

The autonomy of the parties to collective bargaining can only be preserved if there is no legal corset and if both sides have equal means at their disposal in negotiations and in labour disputes. And this includes lockouts.

So much for the principle. The employers' argument was sustained by the court and that of the trade unions rejected.

But presiding Judge Professor Gerhard Müller, unlike the employers' associations, attributed different weight to strikes and lockouts.

While the right to strike is a necessary part of labour disputes, this cannot be said in equal measure for lockouts.

The court reasoned that the employers and their associations depend much less than the trade unions on the instruments of industrial dispute in lending emphasis to their claims.

The balance of power would be upset if the employers had equally effective weapons at their disposal — weapons that would make any strike intolerably risky.

Judge Müller thus aptly described a social situation in which the trade unions are no longer underdogs but a powerful element of a community in which the employers, backed by capital, nevertheless have the power of forcing the unions to their knees in a major confrontation.

The fact that such a development is unlikely in our democratic state is neither here nor there.

The court only drew the limits for industrial action in a free country and a liberal economy.

Key term here is the "proportionality of means" — a term which was used in the second lockout ruling of this court in 1971. In fact, Judge Müller is the coiner of this term.

It is to be hoped that the employers in Baden-Württemberg's metal industry will bear this in mind. They used to hit much harder in former years. This time, however, they remained within limits which Judge Müller in his summary called exemplary: when a strike in a specific area involves less than 25 per cent of the workers, the number of locked out people should be lower.

The printing industry failed to meet this yardstick because the ratio of strikers and locked out workers was 1 to 14.

This was clearly at odds with the principle of proportionality of means and therefore illegal.

The court also ruled the selective lockout of union members only illegal because it violated the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of coalition.

It was thus a split ruling, turning down the lawsuit of the Metalworkers' Union and upholding that of the Printers' Union.

The court thus approved of lockouts though distinguishing between the various forms.

There was nothing dogmatic about the ruling, and union attorney Ge... aptly remarked in court: "We must not overlook the facts of life when thinking in legal terms."

It was a pragmatic ruling based on the insight that total balance cannot be achieved in a dynamic society and that no legal system can therefore demand it.

Does the ruling therefore make for legal certainty in our era?

Employers and unions will have to do a lot of thinking about the consequences of the ruling. The action by the printing industry is unlikely to be repeated. But parties to collective bargaining will have to ponder the question whether strikes and lockouts have not become obsolete in a society where workers and employers can be affected nation-wide ... because there is a labour dispute in progress in Baden-Württemberg.

Judge Müller has tried to get the parties to collective bargaining to agree on rules for labour disputes.

Out of court, he raised the question whether we should not consider an entirely new system as a means of arriving at wage deals. But employers and unions are still far removed from such ideas.

On the contrary, they are pondering new strategies and tactics in labour disputes. It is too early to file away the issue.

Heinz Michel

(Die Zeit, 13 June 1980)

BP Germany unveils pioneer profit-sharing scheme

BP Germany has decided to introduce profit sharing. It is the second of the Federal Republic's 100 biggest companies (by sales) and the first of its oil companies to take this step.

The BP scheme is so simple in comparison with others in the country that the chief executive, Hellmuth Buddenberg, was able to explain the deal in just a few typewritten lines and a graph when he announced the plan at a staff meeting.

The only other firm in the top 100 to have genuine profit-sharing scheme is the Bertelsmann publishing group.

Most other companies that permit their staff to participate in profits or capital have had to resort to complicated contracts which kept batteries of lawyers busy for months in an effort to leave nothing to chance.

Karl-Heinz Banse, Works Council chairman of BP's Hamburg headquarters, says: "I must admit to being a bit proud of the scheme.

"I know, of course, that the trade unions are sceptical regarding profit sharing, but I also have to guard the interests of my colleagues. We Works Council members have therefore helped management in developing the scheme because we hold that our capital accumulation aims for the staff are better achieved within the company than through legislation and collective bargaining deals."

Herr Banse knows that the present BP chairman was already pondering possibilities of profit sharing when he was only the financial manager of the company. At that time, he discussed the problems of the scheme with the late Jürgen Ponto, then chairman of the Dresdner Bank.

Herr Banse: "But we first had to get out of the phase where we had to struggle for survival. As long as BP was in the red and, as was the case in the mid-1970s, we had to fear that our British parent company would lose interest in its German business, there was little point in discussing such plans.

"However, when the staff is as motivated as ours was during the crisis we know that we have enough support to promote staff interests."

In fact, staff motivation was what motivated Herr Buddenberg.

"Personal involvement on the part of our staff is an important prerequisite for the company's success and for the staff members themselves in developing their personalities" he said. "I want them to enjoy their work and to have an interest in the company."

Buddenberg hopes that his initiative will act as an icebreaker and will hasten the decision of other companies to evolve similar profit-sharing schemes.

In order that the staff should not lose interest in the company's performance in times when business is not exactly spectacular, as was the case in 1979, the scheme becomes operational even if profits are very small and before any dividend is paid to the shareholders.

The calculation of shares of profits that will go to the shareholders and the staff takes place in three phases:

- To start with, the staff gets one per cent of annual profits shown in the balance sheet based on their annual income (basic plus extras). The shareholders also get one per cent on capital. For this first phase, it suffices for the company to make only a minimal profit of DM14m, given present salaries (about DM300m) and the capital of today (DM1.1bn). Last year, BP made a profit of DM200m.
- Then adequate interest on capital is calculated, using the interest rate of fixed interest securities as a guideline.
- Last, the profits that remain are divided up in such a manner that every staff member gets an additional profit sharing sum of up to a maximum of four per cent of his annual income. The remainder goes to the shareholders.

The profit sharing bonus is transferred separate from the salary and is fully taxable.

Herr Buddenberg concedes that it might seem illogical to give the staff a portion of profits although they are anyway paid for the productive work they have done while shareholders get nothing initially.

"But we have deliberately done it this way because, on the other hand, the staff members' profit sharing has an upper limit whereas the shareholders' doesn't," he said.

But then the staff's participation in sharing losses is also limited. They need not fear having to fork out in bad years. Their share of losses is carried forward to the following year and offset against possible profits. And should there be a longer period of poor business, the staff's share of losses is carried for for a maximum of two years.

Herr Buddenberg is confident, however, that all this is only theoretical. "We shall try even harder than before not to have any losses. But should we get into the red anyway we'll — all of us together — make every effort to get out of it again as soon as possible."

Herr Buddenberg hopes that after two or three good years he will be able to start on the second tier of his model.

Once BP Germany has demonstrated its success to the public, he hopes to convert it from a 100 per cent British subsidiary into a mixed-ownership company.

A part of the capital is to be offered to German buyers. Moreover, the staff will then be able to combine profit sharing with participation in the capital of the company. Any staff member prepared to invest half of his profit sharing bonus in BP shares will be given an extra per cent of profits.

"This means that a worker with an annual income of DM50,000 would receive a profit sharing bonus of DM500 in the first phase, to be augmented by another

Continued on page 7

THE EEC

Initial hurdles for an enlarged Community

No sooner did the EEC governments take the budget-share hurdle that was put in their way by London than they were faced with new problems: Greece's accession to the Community on 1 January 1981 and Spain's (probably) in 1982 are likely to aggravate the structural and financial problems. Erich Hauser, Brussels correspondent of *Frankfurter Rundschau*, analyses the problems arising from the enlargement of the Community.

The last remaining problems, such as the removal of tariffs between Greece and the EFTA states Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Finland and Iceland, are being settled swiftly and smoothly.

The first 122 Greek Euro-officials will be moving to their offices at the EEC Commission in the autumn.

Greece's ambassador to the EEC, Marcos Economides, gives the impression of a man still operating at half speed while he and his staff bide their time until they can step on the gas.

He is convinced that this country's economy will be successful in the tough competition that marks the Common Market and EFTA.

While Greek goods have long been hampered by tariffs on the EEC market (due to Greece's Association Treaty with the Community), Athens will have to start removing tariffs gradually over a six-year period.

Although Greece is represented on all Community bodies (and also has a say in the European Political Cooperation where it has a seat and a vote) it is being treated with kid gloves so far as its contributions to the Community coffers are concerned.

During a transitional period, Athens will receive considerably more from the coffers than it pays into them — at the expense of the other EEC members.

Old hands among the Brussels EEC diplomats expect Greece to prove a "difficult partner" — not only because the socialist opposition party PASOK is even more anti-Community than the British Labour Party but also because the Karamanlis government was much too superficial in its negotiations, virtually saying "just show me where to sign."

It is generally felt that the Greeks said to themselves "let's first get in, then we can negotiate about everything."

Brussels is still traumatised by the successive British attempts — first by Harold Wilson, then by James Callaghan and now by Margaret Thatcher — to change the rules once in the club.

This apprehension is one of the reasons why the EC Commission and the Nine are trying to be more thorough in their negotiations with Madrid and Lisbon.

Lorenzo Natali, the Italian vice-president of the Commission who is in charge of the enlargement, does not tend to dramatise — unlike many of his fellow countrymen.

He says: "We must realise that the problems we already have in the Community — unemployment, agricultural surplus production and the restructuring of industry — could worsen as a result of the enlargement, not to mention the other problems that go with it."

The improved trade between the Community and the new members will benefit the already developed region, says Signor Natali, and make the problems of the under-developed ones worse.

Although Roy Jenkins, the president of the Commission, told Spain's Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez last December that all would be done to complete the accession negotiations with Spain by the end of this year, the schedule looked quite different at the end of May.

It provides for the settlement of all "simple" issues by the spring of 1981. The actual negotiations on provisions for the gradual integration in the common agricultural market of Spain and Portugal are to come after the French elections. The same goes for the settlement of the financial issues.

The Accession Treaties are to be signed by mid-1982 at the latest to give the parliaments time to ratify them so that the third enlargement of the Community can take place in 1983 or the beginning of 1984.

The governments in Athens, Madrid and Lisbon hope that joining the EEC will buttress democracy in their countries because no dictatorships may be members. They also expect economic benefits and a "scapegoat" should rapid modernisation lead to social unrest.

And the Nine hope to improve their security by tying the three southern countries to central Europe. They also hope to shore up democracy in the new member nations; but they realise that they will impose an economic burden.

Significantly, both the Bonn Ministry of Economic Affairs and most economic research institutes in Germany have voiced considerable reservation.

As a result of the Association Treaty, Greece has been a quasi member since 1961. The country's economic development in the past few years has been remarkable and there will be no major problem in integrating Greece's agriculture.

But the opening of the Greek market for EEC and EFTA goods as well as products from the developing countries (due to the Community's trade policy) combined with the lowering of tariffs for Japanese and American goods, brings the danger of excessively tough competition for Greece's domestic business.

Moreover, the gradual raising of agricultural prices to Community levels will have an inflationary effect. The cost to the Nine of countering this could be very high.

Portugal, which has roughly the same population as Greece (9 million) is considerable poorer. Its economic position has been appalling ever since it lost its colonies.

The Community and the individual members have been lending a helping hand in the form of credits since 1976.

Portugal's industry consists mainly of small companies which will now also receive EEC credits to the tune of about DM130m.

A ray of hope lies in the fact that the state-owned French car manufacturer Renault intends to build a plant in Portugal.

After joining, Portugal will have to import food (sugar and animal feed) from the EEC instead if buying it on world markets. This, together with rising agricultural prices at home, will speed up inflation.

Portugal will also contribute to Community surpluses, adding to the wine lake and the tomato mountain. It might also add to meat surpluses because the high Community prices would prove an incentive to produce more.


It will have to be subsidised from EEC coffers for many years unless growth is promoted by private investors from the Community and the United States who might be attracted by the low wages.

The membership candidate that really makes the Brussels Eurocrats shake in their boots is Spain, the highest developed and the most populous (36 million) of the three. Some of its industry could well create redundancies in the northern EEC nations.

Ninety three per cent of Spain's businesses employ fewer than 25 people and they are likely to be hardest hit once Madrid has to reduce its tariff barriers.

Spain's unemployment rate, now 10 per cent, is likely to rise. This may, however, be mitigated if such multinational giants as General Motors and Ford carry out their investment plans in Spain. Of course, this would mean additional competition for the established motor industry in the Community.

Spanish shipyards and parts of the steel industry are highly competitive. Growth rates in the country's electronics industry are good. But this branch of business would like to continue enjoying the protection high import duties offer because — like Spain's chemicals industry — it still feels unequal to the task of competing with foreign products.



Unbiased studies see the major handicap of Spain's industry in the fact that it has for decades been protected from foreign competition and that its management is not competition-oriented.

These problems are further aggravated by excessive social security payments.

To keep unemployment at the present level, Spain will have to create 160,000 new jobs every year.

The integration of Spain's agriculture into the EEC market is a major problem. That country will account for one-third of the agricultural population of the Twelve.

The wine surplus resulting from the three new members is likely to amount to between 5 and 10 million hektoliters a year. But this problem is not as grave as that posed by Spanish olive oil, the production of which involves two million farmers.

Raising the olive oil price to present Community levels would cost the EEC DM3.8bn a year. So far, Spain has been maintaining its olive price at a high level artificially by heavy taxes on all other vegetable oils.

But olive oil, citrus, wine and tomatos from the three new member nations will also pose a problem because producers in Israel, Cyprus, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia will find it hard to sell on Community markets.

Since the EEC has cooperation treaties with these countries which provide for facilitated imports, they will have to be compensated through financial assistance. Preliminary talks are already in progress.

Freedom of movement for Community workers will not be granted instantly to the new members. A seven-year transition period is envisaged, though Madrid opposes this.

This dispute can only be solved by swiftly creating hundreds of thousands of jobs in the three new member nations themselves through regional subsidies.

A group of Social Democratic Euro-MPs, among them Heidi Wieczorek-Zeul, Gerd Walter, Gerhard Schmidt and Thomas von der Vring, wants to maintain close contact with MPs in Madrid and Lisbon to ensure that the social consequences of the enlargement are taken into account when drafting the teatries.

This would apply to the consequences to workers in the old and the new member nations. These Euro-MPs hold that this would not hamper but promote the political objectives.

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 June 1980)

Continued from page 6

DM1,500 if profits for the year are high enough.

Those who opt to buy BP shares will be rewarded for their willingness to take a risk with an additional DM500. Moreover, he will not only profit from the profit sharing scheme but will, as a shareholder, also draw dividends.

There has been a lot of speculation on how Buddenberg has managed to sway the British head office in favour of profit sharing and the subsequent trading of BP shares on German stock exchanges.

After all, the London directors are bound to ask themselves which of their subsidiaries will be next to come up with a similar scheme.

Moreover, British business has so far shown less understanding than their German counterparts for this type of staff participation.

There are, after all, several hundred medium sized companies in this country which have profit and capital participation schemes, and politicians of all parties have been promoting this, though without much success.

Works Council Chairman Banse: "Our London people have watched with great interest and, indeed, respect the progress we've made in the past few years.

"As a result, they now trust us to do the right thing with the profit sharing scheme as well."

Michael Jungblut

(Die Zeit, 13 June 1980)

■ AVIATION

Europeans gain ground in crucial US market

European aircraft manufacturers seem finally to be making headway in North America. The Munich-made BK 117, a nimble, versatile helicopter, is following in the footsteps of the Airbus, the commercial jet that wiped fond smiles off US manufacturers' faces.

For years it has been generally accepted that unless you can sell your aircraft in North American markets your chances of survival in the aircraft manufacturing business are nil.

This is a lesson all European manufacturers have learnt. Marcel Dassault's Mirage jets, although masterpieces of European aero engineering, only made the grade because they sold well in America.

The Airbus did not really start earning big money until sales managers in Toulouse managed to clinch a deal with Eastern Airlines, the major US domestic operator based in Miami.

By the same token (but the other side of the coin), the VFW 614, Germany's first commercial jet airliner, flopped when it failed to establish a foothold in the American market.

This, then, is the hard-nosed commercial background against which the staggering success of the BK 117 Hummel helicopter, jointly designed and manufactured by Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm in Germany and Kawasaki Heavy Industries in Japan, must be seen.

The helicopter is taking US markets by storm, and it is a surprising success story, considering Bell Helicopters of Fort Worth, Texas, reportedly command 60 per cent of world markets.

Ever since the Hummel (it means bumble-bee in German) started whirling its rotor blades life has been topsy-turvy for experienced and successful US aircraft designers and sales staff. They just cannot figure out what has gone wrong with the world.

So far only two prototype Hummels are flying, and series production of the 275km/h (172mph) whirlybird is not due to start until later this year. Yet the output has already been sold until the end of 1983.

What is more, more than 70 per cent of the 135 Hummels that are scheduled for completion in either Germany or Japan over the next three years have been bought by US customers.

Making good helicopters has come to represent good business. In the North Sea alone the demand for helicopters to service offshore operations is expected to be at least 2,000 this decade.

At present fewer than 200 ply between Norway, England, Scotland and the Continental coastline. Worldwide, but excluding the communist countries, the demand for helicopters large and small is expected to increase steadily this decade to a total for the 80s of between 25,000 and 30,000.

There is no mistaking the trend towards larger units with a more substantial payload capacity, and this is what promises to make the BK 117 such a money-spinner.





Vertical rise in the market: the BK 117 Hummel. (Photo:

The 135 advance sales of BK 117 eight- and ten-seater helicopters have been mainly to American customers. The unit price will be $1,024,000 until 1983, then increasing to $1,150,000.

For decades German and European aircraft manufacturers have relied on government grants from the taxpayer's pocket to stay in business, but this has not been true of either the BK 117 or its helicopter predecessors from MBB's Ottobrunn, Munich, works.

More than 1,000 of the previous model, the BO 105, have been sold, and about 500 are already in use in 30 countries and four continents. Five hundred is roughly the break-even point, so from now on the BO 105 will be earning good money.

Ironically enough, the world's largest aircraft manufacturer, Boeing of Seattle, runs a BO 105 from Munich as its works and VIP chopper and not, as might be expected, a Bell, a Sikorsky or, for that matter, a Boeing.

And there is no present prospect of the BO 105 boom ending either, although the Munich manufacturers have had their difficulties at times.

The BO 105's teething troubles undoubtedly included engine failure and maintenance costs that were too high. But Kurt Pfleiderer, head of MBB's helicopter division, says:

"We anticipate sales of 1,500 units in all over the years to come and now reckon 2,000 BO 105s sold is no longer mere wishful thinking."

Herr Pfleiderer is a canny, cautious Swabian and not the sort of man given to giving less than his considered opinion. So his sanguine forecast carries weight.

Unlike the BO 105, the BK 117 is first and foremost a multi-purpose helicopter for civilian use. It is 13 metres long, 3.84 metres tall and has a range of 545 kilometres, making it an ideal executive whirlybird.

This is not to say there will never be a military version or versions. There is, in any case, no aircraft to rival the helicopter for versatility and the speed at which it can be converted.

Like its predecessor, the BK 117 will be used in many cases for air-sea rescue and disaster relief operations. In others it will, again like the BO 105, be used as a police helicopter.

MBB and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, who signed an agreement to join forces in manufacturing the versatile BK 117 in 1975, opted for the jointless head principle that has proved successful in the BO 105.

In this respect the Hummel is identical with the military version of the BO 105. Power is provided by twin Lycoming LTS 101-650 B1 shaft turbine engines developing 650 shaft horse power, or 485 kilowatts, each.

Many other details were taken straight from the BO 105, including the tailfin and the stabiliser, but these were redesigned for the BK 117.

The manufacturers sincerely hope that as a result the new chopper will have fewer teething troubles than its predecessor.

The first BK 117 prototype made its maiden flight in Ottobrunn, Munich, on 13 June 1979. The first 6 to 10 assembly-line helicopters are scheduled for delivery in 1981.

In 1982 a further 50 to 60 will follow and by 1983 annual unit production should have reached 100.

"We are counting on building at least 1,000 BK 117s in the years ahead and, of course, on selling them too, which is much more important," says Herr Pfleiderer. His optimism is based on sound market research. The confidence shown by German and Japanese helicopter men in the BK 117 has taken aback their American counterparts.

He and his Japanese opposite numbers are quietly confident the BK 117 will prove more than a match for the Bell 222, a 10-seater all-rounder.

At the Las Vegas helicopter fair last year options were taken out on 30 BK 117s straight away, even though only a mock-up was on show.

There is another important reason for this flying start. "We never imagined," says MBB's Kurt Pfleiderer, "that despite the distance between Germany and Japan collaboration with Kawasaki would prove so fair and good.

"From our point of view the BK 117 success story so far has been due to no small extent to the exemplary cooperation between our two companies handling the project."

The first balance sheet is impressive. The European Airbus has already emerged as a brisk seller and serious competitor of US aero giants. The BO 105 triumph now seems about to be followed by a BK 117 boom.

US competitors take a jaundiced view of the entire operation because a German-Japanese co-production seems likely to make more of a mark on American markets than either country could have expected to do on its own.

Karl Morgenstern

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 13 June 1980)

THE ENVIRONMENT

Concern over increasing carbon dioxide count

Two dozen scientists and politicians from 15 countries met recently at an Aspen Institute workshop in West Berlin to discuss the alarming increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, an increase of 15 to 20 per cent since the turn of the century.

Carbon dioxide is generated as a by-product of combustion. In the quantity in which it exists in the atmosphere it does not yet, as far as is known, represent a danger to either animals or man.

So there are no statutory limits to the amount that is poured into the atmosphere. Yet in the long term a continued increase in the carbon dioxide count could well bring about a crucial change in the earth's heat balance and climate.

Latest surveys indicate that the carbon dioxide is fairly evenly distributed in the atmosphere, where it allows short-wave solar radiation through to the earth's surface but prevents the outflow of long-wave infra-red radiation reflected from the surface of the earth.

This is the so-called hothouse effect first described in the 19th century by a Swedish scientists. If the carbon dioxide continues to increase, average earth temperatures will increase too.

Consequences of this foreseeable development and essential counter-measures were discussed at the Berlin gathering, which was sponsored by the parent Aspen Institute in Aspen, Colorado, and by the World Meteorological Organisation, Geneva.

Professor Bach of the Applied Climatology and Environment Studies Centre at Münster University outlined at a press conference assumptions scientists made on the basis of estimated future energy consumption.

The current atmospheric carbon dioxide count of roughly 0.033 per cent could be expected to double over the next 50 years, he said, resulting in a mean global temperature increase of between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees centigrade.

Such estimates were, he admitted, fraught with uncertainty. The role of the oceans as carbon dioxide absorbers had yet to be clarified at all satisfactorily.

A temperature increase of less than one degree, he said, could be assimilated by the earth without undue difficulty or serious consequences.

Yet estimates assume that temperature increases at the earth's poles will be three to four times above average, resulting in polar icecaps melting, higher sea levels and changes in climate circulation.

This would mean changes in rainfall, evaporation and ground humidity distribution, with attendant consequences for agriculture and food output for a growing world population.

There would be countries that gained from this temperature change and others that lost. The United States, for instance, would probably be a loser, whereas India seemed likely to prove a winner, with more rainfall.

In the Soviet Union the growth period would be longer but rainfall would be down. So the carbon dioxide problem, conference delegates stressed, is a universal problem.

Joint action is necessary and three possibilities were discussed at the conference. The first was that of filtering carbon dioxide and other harmful substance out of exhaust fumes.

Technically this is feasible, but what is then to be done with the enormous amounts of waste carbon dioxide? Proposals ranged from pumping them into the ocean's lower depths to sealing them in disused coal seams.

But this possibility, as Professor Bach pointed out, is extremely uneconomic. The second was for mankind to adjust to the expected climate changes, but the Berlin conference felt this was most unrealistic.

The earth is so overpopulated there is no longer enough room for mass migration and it remains to be seen whether genetic engineering could produce crop plants suited to be change in climate.

So the conference was unanimously in favour of the third option, the development of prevention strategies. Primary energy must, for instance, be used more rationally to reduce to a minimum the increase in fossil fuel consumption.

The range of energy options must also be extended. Coal, gas, oil and wood must increasingly give way to non-fossil fuels and solar energy, wind power and maybe atomic energy to help solve the problem.

The conference wondered how this strategy might be implemented in the Third World in view of the developing countries' pressing need to catch up with the industrialised world.

Rashmi Mayur of the Urban Development Institute, Bombay, said what mattered first and foremost in the Third World was to make people aware that a carbon dioxide problem existed.


In addition to the enormous information shortfall and white spots on the research map as to, say, the developing countries' carbon dioxide output and the extent to which destruction of tropical rain forests contributes towards carbon dioxide imbalance, developing countries were caught in a cleft stick.

There could be no doubt that as a result of global climate changes agriculture in most countries in the world's hunger belt would face even tougher insoluble problems.

Yet at the same time these were the very countries that needed to step up energy consumption if they were to make any headway whatever towards development. Walter Orr Roberts, director of the Aspen research programme on food, climate and the future of the world, wondered whether the developing countries, having already paid a high price for atmospheric pollution by the industrialised world, were not entitled to the first option on such cheap energy as remained. There must certainly be a plan of action stipulating carbon dioxide output ceilings, with quotas allocated on moral grounds to the various parts of the world.

Marion Kern

(Der Tagesspiegel, 14 June 1980)



One of the main attractions at the Hanover show is this fireman's ladder which can extend to 53 metres.

Firefighting robots on show at international fair

Firefighting robots were among the exhibits at Interschutz '80, the international firefighting and disaster relief trade fair in Hanover.

More than 460 exhibitors from 17 countries demonstrated on more than 66,500 square metres (17.25 acres) of floor space the entire range of emergency service devices.

They included the Scorpion, a robot handling device developed by Karlsruhe nuclear research centre and commissioned by the Bonn Research Ministry.

At the Hanover fair this sturdy tracked vehicle could be seen trundling up to a fireman and gently lifting the helmet off his head.

In practice the Scorpion has already been used in reactor emergencies in Austria and the Netherlands.

Red is the color of the fire brigade and it was the colour of most exhibits. They fascinated both the experts and the general public.

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WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZZEITUNG

They included a sophisticated, high-speed airport fire engine costing over DM1m and veteran hand pump devices as used between 1450 and 1800.

The DM1m air crash tender can pump 9,000 litres of water and 1,000 litres of foam on to the blazing plane. It weighs 28.5 tonnes and has automatic controls.

Disaster relief exhibits ranged from field hospitals to meals on wheels. The latest fire engines pointed the nozzles of their hoses in impressive array. Protective clothing for all manner of uses was on show.

An Italian fire engine was claimed to ensure 100-per-cent success in fighting fires caused by carburettors, and Molotov cocktails.

Then there is a 150-tonne Bundesbahn crane that hoists a 63-tonne diesel locomotive as though it were a toy train. Two men can make the gigantic device turn 180 degrees effortlessly.

The locomotive is then lowered on to the track to a round of applause. Its bogies have come to rest on the track true to the nearest millimetre.

Firefighting demonstrations on a 1 in 10 scale model size could be seen in a neighbouring hall where Wiesbaden firemen showed model firefighting exercises as they will have taken place around 1910 and between 1500 and 1850.

Collectors will also have been delighted by displays of helmets, uniform badges, model fire engines and firefighting postage stamps.

The most expensive item of this kind was a French helmet costing DM300 and made of high-grade steel. A scale model of a steam-powered Mississippi fire engine was on sale at about DM100.

Ehrenfried Markert

(Handelsblatt, 11 June 1980)



Remote-controlled fire extinguisher with camera shows it paces at the Hanover show. (Photos: Wilhelm Hauschild)

■ FILMS

Cartoons take honours in TV festival

This year's Prix Jeunesse children's TV film festival in Munich was a triumph for Westdeutscher Rundfunk and its children's film director Gert K. Münterfering, who won two main prizes.

The prize-winning films were two cartoons entitled *Oh wie schön ist Panama* and *Als die Igel grösser wurden*.

Oh wie schön ist Panama is about a bear and a tiger who set off one day to find Panama, the land of their dreams.

At the end they are back at home again, but they believe they have found Panama because — and this is the moral of the story — Panama is wherever one feels at home.

The film is based on a story by the well-known German Children's book author Janosch. The story won the 1979 German Children's Book Proze.

Janosch can certainly be well pleased with this version, which not only preserves the charm, humour and warmth of the original but if anything enhances it thanks to skilful animation and good speakers.

There were some complaints about the tiger's childish-female voice on the grounds that this was a perpetuation of an anti-emancipatory role cliché. The objection was registered and then forgotten.

The idea for the Igel film came from the WDR children's programme team and graphic artists Franz and Ursula Wintzensen.

The film tells the story of super-hedgehogs with steel-hard spikes which can even stand up to car tyres, thus saving them from bloody deaths on the road.

When this film was first broadcast *Frankfurter Rundschau* wrote that it "was a highly imaginative and aesthetically enjoyable experience."

Cartoon technique is used here "as an artistic means of telling a story which contains real and imaginative elements, and to tell it in such a way that it seems credible — which does not mean real."

Both films are undoubtedly successful examples of their category, yet one could have wished for a greater range to be covered in the awarding of prizes.

Story-telling does not just mean animating amusing and delightful cartoons for small children; it also means shooting real-life action films for juveniles.

An example of this kind was *Mysz* (The Mouse), a Polish production that came hard behind the hedgehog film in third place.

It tells the tale of schoolchildren, young people, and the problems they have among themselves. It is a film with which juvenile viewers can readily identify and which they are happy to discuss.

One of the presentors of the Munich competition, Hendrik Schmidt of *Evangelischer Presse-Dienst*, Frankfurt, reiterated at the end of the proceedings what members of the jury had evidently commented all along.

There were, he said, too few programmes for juveniles that dealt with their real problems, especially in connection with the working world.

There were also no entries whatever in a category that a few years ago was overrun, programmes for children of pre-school age.

Yet programmes aimed at small children were award-winners, and not only Panama in the story-telling category but also *Flügge*, a Yugoslav entry that was awarded a prize in the music and entertainment bracket.

This Yugoslav film was most highly rated of all individual entries and carried power of conviction by virtue of its imaginative character and the easy good-humoured way in which it put across simple concepts and facts about the environment.

Zum Klingen bringen, an imaginative pantomime entry by Swiss TV, was watched with similar fascination. Two mime artistes demonstrate the sound of kitchen equipment in such an imaginative and captivating way that viewers are tempted to join in.

This Swiss entry was similarly awarded a prize in the music and entertainment category, the third prize-winner being *Reggae*, a combhination of information and entertainment for young people put together by Austrian entrants.

The only misgivings members of the jury had was that the Austrian film might take too lax a line in its attitude towards narcotics. Had it not been for this feeling, *Reggae* might well have fared even better.

The Book Tower, an entry by ITV's Yorkshire TV of Leeds, England, won an award in the information category. It is similar in many ways to the *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* series *Lemmi und die Schmöker*.

Books for children and young people are presented in short acted scenes or animated episodes. A presenter links the various entries with a flow of objective information and gags.

A prize in this section was also awarded to *A Journey into Infinity*, entered by Sweden. In an effective combination of film footage, still photos and animation it shows "what we know today about the origin, development and extent of the universe and about the laws of nature that govern it."

In terms of the overall quality of entries the Scandinavian countries were, as ever, well ahead of the field. They were responsible for 5 of the 18 prize-winning productions in all three categories.

The East bloc, in contrast, had nothing much to offer this year. Neither Czechoslovakia, a country with a TV reputation, nor the Soviet Union, neither the GDR nor Bulgaria nor Hungary came anywhere near the level of prize-winning entries.


Only Yugoslavia won a prize, though Poland came very close. The Third World had a number of impressive entries, though impressive only in the sense that they were produced under extremely difficult conditions.

This makes any comparison with far more experienced and better-equipped TV nations such as West Germany and Scandinavia invidious.

A Kenyan producer complained that he and his Third World colleagues could not compete with the technically brilliant works of the industrial nations. This was undoubtedly discouraging for him and for his colleagues from Africa and Latin America.

The best answer to these complaints was that two special prizes went to African productions. The Unicef prize went to Kenya's *The Tender Ones*. The Prix Jeunesse Foundation Advisory Board Prize went to the Ghanaian production, *Who is to blame?* The Unesco prize went to Israel for *Pillar of Salt*. This year for the first time some prize-winners were selected by computer: 89 entries by 290 TV directors and producers were shown and at the end participants and public were asked to vote for what they thought were the best works. The computer did the rest. The judges again criticised the fact that in many TV films boys rather than girls are the heroes and that

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Growing up in pre-war Berlin: from 'Die Kinder aus Nr. 67' (Photo: ...)

Realities of politics face pre-war children

Die Kinder aus Nr. 67 is the story of two boys growing up in the Berlin of the last year of the Weimar Republic.

The film opens with the boys, Erwin and Paul, hauling a Nazi flag down from one of the windows in the flat. But in the end, politics divides them and they go their very different ways.

Times are very hard, but Paul and Erwin are not bothered — they are saving up for a real leather football instead of the limp ball of rolled-up socks they use now.

They tear the stolen swastika flag and make shoe-cleaning rags out of it. Then they are off down to the underground stations to shine shoes.

Or they collect horse dung off the streets and sell it to gardeners. They put all their earnings into a well-hidden savings box.

This idyll of the backyards of Berlin is, of course, overshadowed by the signs of the times. Erwin, Paul and their friends fight with a Hitler Youth group who move into their meeting place, a disused factory.

Erwin catches Paul stealing bread rolls but instead of telling the police and pocketing the reward he gives part of his savings to his hungry friend. When Paul's out-of-work father is about to be visited by the bailiffs, Erwin turns a children's fancy dress party into a collection and they just manage to stop the family being evicted.

When at last the two boys can afford to buy the long-awaited football, it has lost its meaning. Paul joins the Hitler Youth, Erwin and his family join the resistance.

Directors Usch Barthelmess-Weller and Werner Meyer, whose first film this is, use an insert technique to underline a time difference of half a year in the film. This was not really necessary.

Life in the backyards from the boys' point of view and the concentration on ordinary everyday living without spectacular private or national dramas effectively illustrate the subtle, gradual, tentacle-like hold dictatorship takes.

Social conditions, unemployment and all the material cares these workers are subject to make it only too clear th[at] the SA must have been an escape [and] a refuge for many of the men, and [the] temptations of the Hitler Youth with [its] group warmth must have been ju[st as] great to the boys.

This ambivalence comes over [most] clearly in the fancy-dress party sc[ene]. Suddenly, uninvited, a few uniform[ed] men appear — one of them lives in th[e] house.

There is no immediate and viole[nt] fight, as we have come to expect in s[uch] films. Nothing specific happens. But t[he] contrast between the uniforms and [the] costumes, the dissonance between [the] games of the backyard child actor[s] and the heel-clicking men in unif[orm] puts a immediate damper on the m[ood] of the party.

Indeed the film is marked through[out] by a refreshingly low-key approach [and] calm accuracy. The film, though by [no] means expensively produced, is remar[k]ably authentic because of great atten[tion] to detail: the atmosphere of the Be[rlin] backyards is perfectly captured.

The children, as long as they are [kept] moving, are excellent actors, and [the] production undoubtedly owes much [to] the unobtrusive precision of camera[man] Jürgen Jürges (to whom many other [de]butant film makers have cause to be [grate]teful).

The film, based on the child[ren's] book of the same name by Lisa Tetzn[er] written in 1932, is not an Aufklärungs[-] *film* on the political past. It leaves too many gaps for that.

Most young people watching it w[ill] probably be baffled by throwaway ref[er]ences to the "unity front" and t[he] "general strike."

SA and Hitler Youth will prob[ably] seem vague organisations to them, [and] they are unlikely to grasp the subtle [soc]ial distinctions between the tenant[s] living at the front and those at the back of the blocks of flats. It is up to teach[ers] and parents to fill in this back[]ground.

The film's major achievement is th[at] it awakens interest in these things.

H. G. Pflaum

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 June 1980)

LITERATURE

Writers' letter maintains the political tradition



Günter Grass (Photo: Sven Simon)

When Helmut Schmidt compared the current international crisis [wi]th the world situation in August 1914, [fou]r German writers wrote him an open [let]ter.

They called on him and his govern[m]ent to bear in mind the Germans' [sp]ecial responsibility for peace "given [tha]t Germany has twice laid waste the [...]of this continent in two wars."

[Th]e letter, signed by Thomas Brasch, [Gün]ter Grass, Sarah Kirsch and Peter [Sch]neider, reminds us of Brecht's warn[ing] in 1951: "Will we have war?" he [as]ked, and answered: "If we arm for war [we] will have war." "Will Germans shoot Germans? If they do not talk to one [an]other, they will shoot at one another."

Brecht's open letter to German artists [an]d writers ended with the famous warn[in]g: "Great Carthage waged three wars. It was still powerful after the first, it was still habitable after the second. It disappeared from the face of the earth after the third."

So the letter from the four writers is part of an honourable, though completely ineffective German tradition of political commitment by writers.

"The First World War started, we are told, in the Serbian city of Sarajevo, the Second World War in my home town of Danzig: now they say Tehran will be the start of the third ... it is true, that is how far mankind has come, it can count to three."

These words are quoted from Grass's latest book *Kopfgeburten oder die Deutschen sterben aus*, a novel that deals among other things with the international political situation.

But Grass is not to be intimidated — he rebels. Why, he asks, should he give up his puns, his exuberant joy in life, and say farewell to the Muses "because American and Russian power have taught us to tremble and (since Vietnam and Prague) dictated their morality to us?" He says that to do this would be "to show respect for stupid power, to accept their stinking morality."

Grass mocks the destructive logic of war, which destroyed Danzig. "I can resurrect the city of Danzig, now known as Gdansk, with words alone."

None of the powerful can match me. They are ridiculous and bunglers into the bargain. Proudly I deny their competence to disturb me in my writing."

In this work, the products of Grass's imagination take shape and are constantly colliding with reality; fiction keeps trying to escape reality, but reality usually catches up (and outside Grass's linguistic games it even overtakes).

Where chaos creates order, those who try to reduce everything to a common denominator will certainly find fault.

Despite its fictions, this is no novel; and it is not an essay, though many subjects are dealt with graphically and provocatively, subjectively and originally; political sideswipes abound, and there is plenty of political invective, but it is no pamphlet; and though the scenes change and there are even touristic elements in places, this is no text for the travel pages.

Adventure lurks in the form, in the concurrence of the untimely, in the puzzle the characters play with real and imaginary events.

"I just write at random," says Grass. "I don't drop out." Of course, he is always involved, whether he is travelling "for Goethe" in Asia or when he is describing somewhat illegal meetings between West and East German writers in East Berlin.

In *Kopfgeburten*, Grass tells of a married couple, both teachers "veterans of the student movement continually reflecting on themselves." They, too, go off on a trip to the Far East, but before this they work for the SPD in a general election campaign.

The couple, Harm and Dörte Peters from Itzehoe, have both been influenced by the ecological movement and argue about whether they should bring children into this world and if so how and when and under what circumstances — perhaps to prevent the Germans from dying out?

One of Grass's favourite fictions in this book is the idea of the Germans either as a race which has died out completely or as a race as numerous as the Chinese, whose numbers would then drop to only 80 million.

"Could we do this to the world?" Grass asks.

Especially as there would then be a danger that 100 million Saxons and 120 million Swabians would set out "to impose their pent-up industry on the world."

This thought so horrifies Grass that he says he would rather see the Germans under museum glass cases."

In this work, Grass has invented a past which comes very close to being present and includes the North Rhine-Westphalia *Land* election. Grass forecast that the result of this election would be a fiasco for the SPD, but events proved him wrong. It also includes the ruling on the nuclear power station in Brokdorf near Hamburg — preliminary permission to build has been granted. Grass does not include the ruling on the NDR, probably because in his pessimism he would not have thought it possible. But the book is an indirect rather than a direct description of the present, real though Brokdorf and Gorleben (the site of a massive proposed nuclear disposal complex) are.

Despite the narrative virtuosity, *Kopfgeburten* is a pre-eminently political work. Grass is a blowfly nibbling away at the consensus, a dwarflike Sisyphus pushing the "valley-seeking" stone up the mountain and whistling in the German forest, because fear in this country always had a high growth rate — he is the incorrigible revisionist who "constantly has to take a run-up from distant centuries to be present again."

He admits that his hopes in the snail — i.e. in slow and gradual reform — were mistaken. The snail is too fast, and we are lagging behind.

It is not Mr Doubt who sits in the cellar as in *Tagebuch einer Schnecke* but Mrs Scepticism, a full-bodied matron who smothers all progress. Whoever drinks her milk becomes sour. German straits in election year 1980. Bitterness bordering on the cynical: "Being German means making the impossible possible. Or have there ever been Germans who, having realised that the impossible was possible, have accepted the impossible as not possible?"

It is not all as humorous as his treatment of figures (including Strauss) and fictions might suggest. Reality blocks the way. "We call our cowardly shrinking liberal." The subjunctive is going through a boom.

Nicolas Born's death is another reality: the book is dedicated to him, his early death runs through it like a black thread of mourning. Grass and Born.

Neither violated the otherness of the other. One faced, the other faced away from, the earth. "It is difficult to live on after you." This is no far removed from the baroque elegy, nor from anger at futile deaths.

Grass, Born and the difference: on the one hand, the alert electioneer, supporting Schmidt, the doer, forgetting Strauss and urging Schmidt to do "what remains to be done."

On the other the helpless writer, wanting to measure reality against the possibilities, hinting at these possibilities, introducing an element of utopia against all realities.

Nicolas Born complained: "For the time being the doers are making reality, and literature provides the appropriate realism."

Grass does not try to avoid this dilemma. Very sure of himself, he does not want to leave realism or reality to the doers. This disturbs both the politicians and the aesthetes. They preferred his monumental novel *Der Butt*, whether anyone read it or not.

Heinz Klunker

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 8 June 1980)

Nietzsche revival shows need for intellectual heroes

Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844—1900) is making a comeback. This would not have surprised him. He was, after all, the philosopher of "eternal recurrence."

This country's intelligentsia cannot it seems get by without intellectual heroes. In the sixties and seventies this hero was, of course, Karl Marx.

The latest edition of the Hamburg *Literaturmagazin* is devoted entirely to Nietzsche.

Hanser Verlag of Munich has now published a three-volume biography of Nietzsche by Curt Paul Jahn.

And dtv has also published a two-volume work on *Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur*.

The idolisation of Nietzsche, especially of his aesthetic theories, is a reaction against those who say that art must have a social function. Nietzsche stressed the importance of *Schein* (appearance) in art.

Nietzsche is best known for his ideas on "eternal recurrence." Karl Heinz Bohrer in his authoritative essay in the



Friedrich Nietzsche (Photo: Interpress)

Literaturmagazin says: "We will have to say goodbye to the nation of progression."

But do we have to? Is art only "for the frivolous purpose of pleasing" as Schiller put it?

Social criticisms of art undoubtedly do contain moralistic elements extremely hostile to art — and in recent years we have seen the results of this view taken to the extreme. On the other hand, the interplay between art and society is crucial, if only to prevent art from becoming inaccessible in an ivory tower.

Attacks by the "school of life" on self-satisfied art for art's sake aesthetics have been part of our cultural history since the 19th century.

What, after all, were the motives of Junges Deutschland, the expressionists, the Zurich Dadaists and the Gruppe 47?

The new apostles of Nietzsche are right only in that they want to relativise Marx. But a turning away from modern art?


A cult of the superman, the declaration of critical enlightenment to be an illusion? The veil of aestheticism as the religion of the future?

No thanks. They are substituting one extreme for another.

Why don't we just do without these intellectual saviours for a change?

Mathias Schreiber

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 3 June 1980)



■ MINORITY GROUPS

School bussing project aims at quickening integration

The North Rhine-Westphalia city of Krefeld is running a pilot system of bussing migrant children in an attempt to extend integration of schools.

Finance is provided by the municipality, the *Land* government in Düsseldorf and the Education Department in Bonn.

A typical pupil affected by the scheme is Sibel Alper, an eight-year-old girl born in Turkey.

The Alpers live in the city centre, in a street with friends or relatives in every other house.

Statistically, one in two or three houses in this part of the city is tenanted by Turks.

But Sibel does not go to school in her own borough. Together with other Turkish children, she is bussed every morning to an elementary school.

This school is several kilometres north of her home, in a green part of the city, dominated by gardens, trees and upper class housing.

After four years of elementary schooling, 90 per cent of German children go to the *Gymnasium* (secondary school preparatory to university) or *Realschule*, which is geared more towards the trades and other non-academic occupations.

In another two years, Sibel, too, might be one of these 90 per cent. Her teachers say that she will have no problems coping with one of these two types of secondary schools.

The objective of the scheme is to do something practical about integrating foreign children.

Krefeld is so proud of its project that its Mayor Hansheinz Hauser (CDU) issued an information brochure which he wrote himself.

It says: "Krefeld was probably the first German municipality to have unanimously decided in favour of an educational integration of foreign children — and that as far back as 1974."

Equipped with a good education, Herr Hauser says, out foreign children will be enabled to make the best use of the opportunities in this country.

Krefeld is typical of many cities in Germany's industrial conurbations. Of its population of 230,000, 22,000 are foreigners, mostly Turks, Greeks, Italians, Portuguese and Spaniards.

In the past eight years, at least one out of four children born in Krefeld had non-German parents.

Very few foreigners opt to return to theit home countries — a nation-wide trend.

Mayor Hauser says: "The fluctuation of former years has now given way to an extended stay. For many foreign children, Krefeld is thus not only the place of birth but also their permanent home city."

Unlike many of his opposite numbers in other German cities, mayor Hauser does not shirk a political decision.

"Our problem now is not to decide how many foreigners are to live in Krefeld but *how* they are to live," he says.

But it is a long and thorny road from recognising a political problem to implementing the remedy in everyday life.

The Krefeld experiment is a venture into new territory, and not everybody approves of it.

Education Department official Eike-Dieter Schäfer, still somewhat bitter about the attitude of rejection he met with in various quarters, says: "Until about three years ago we stood with our backs to the wall because nobody dared tackle a deliberate political integration of foreign children in German elementary schools. All municipalities around us stuck to the system of preparatory classes for foreigners."

What he meant was the official policy of the *Länder* (supported by Bonn) that separates foreign children by nationality and then makes them attend special classes for two or four years or perhaps even for all of the nine years of compulsory schooling.

By and large, the bitterness in Krefeld has given way to satisfaction over the successful experiment which has been supported by all parties in the City Council and which other municipalities still have before them.

Meanwhile, the official policy towards foreigners has changed and "integration" is everywhere — be it in Bonn or the *Länder*.

It is also in with the big business associations and the churches. It is the policy of the *Länder* of both political colours.

But even on a lesser plane, there is a change in everyday life at school.

It has always been unclear what the "preparatory classes" are supposed to prepare the foreign children for: were they to be prepared for an eventual return to their parents' home country and schooling there or were they to be prepared for a regular German school?

No progress has been made with such classes — neither in Krefeld nor elsewhere.

One teacher says: "The children's performance deteriorates all the time."

Other municipalities have meanwhile come to realise that things cannot continue as they are. As a result, educationalists are flocking to Krefeld to get a first hand idea of how that city's pilot project works.

These educational policy makers will have to decide on the development of

Frankfurter Rundschau

our school system in the 1980s. But while they are eager to see how Krefeld is faring, the political and educational barriers in many German cities are such as to make it almost impossible to emulate the Krefeld project.

Though CDU-governed, Krefeld has had the support of all political parties in implementing a strict school plan which has been in operation for the past 10 years.

The city's chief administrator of the educational system, Paul Pingen, explains: "Since the early 1970s, we have systematically reshuffled foreign children whenever the quota of foreigners in a particular city district or street reached more than 20 per cent. Sibel Alper is one of these 'overhang' children." ("Overhang" is Krefeld officialese for an excessive quota of foreigners in any given area of the city).

In practical terms this means that the neighbourhood school will accept a maximum of 20 to 30 cent foreigners. All other foreign children must be divided up among schools further away. Herr Pingen: "If we had permitted foreigners to send their children only to schools in the immediate neighbourhood, one in four of our elementary schools would now have a 60 to 70 per cent quota of foreigners." Such ghetto schools are no rarity in Frankfurt's city centre, in Cologne and in Berlin's Kreuzberg district. Every other elementary school in Krefeld now has foreign children. The average is 24 per cent.

Towards an integrated future? Sibel Alper (left) with schoolmates. (Photo: Pressearchiv)

No city official in Krefeld denies a considerable resistance against this enforced reshuffling. But this is being played down.

Those German parents who made a point of sending their children to schools without foreigners are now worried that their offspring will learn less and that aggressiveness will be the result when various nationalities meet head-on.

Some parents, primarily Greeks, have even gone to court. But reasoning and discussion finally led to out-of-court settlements, says Herr Schäfer.

Few educationalists have shown so much stamina in standing up to stubborn Greek parents. Only recently, Hesse's education minister had to give in to the national interests voiced by the Greeks.

There are two reasons for the fact that German parents have gone no further than to voice their scepticism — and even this has now subsided: it turned out after the first four years that the performance of German children was average and that the parents' fear have not been substantiated. In fact, the teachers say that the German children benefited from being with foreigners.

The other reason is that the German children still go to their neighbourhood elementary school and do not have to be bussed.

The bussing system costs Krefeld DM1m a year and involves only Greek and Turkish children.

In the schools involved in the Krefeld pilot project there is one Greek or Turkish child to every three German children in a class.

The Turkish girl, Sibel, for instance, had joint instruction with German children only in a few subjects in the first grade: mathematics, art, music and physical education.

For instruction in German and religion she was picked up by a Turkish teacher and taken to the appropriate classroom. Now, in the third grade, German is also taught jointly.

This being taken from one classroom to another is a cause of unrest for both children and teachers. It is the children themselves who want to be together as much as possible.

More and more of those parents who have decided to stay in Germany permanently have taken their children out of Greek or Turkish language classes.

Krefeld city planners say that there is a trend among foreign parents to move their homes to where their children's school is.

This would seem to be an ideal form of frictionless integration worth emulating — especially in view of the formative importance of the period of elementary schooling for the child.

But Klaus Klemm, one of this country's most outstanding educationalists, warns about a too hasty *imitation* of the Krefeld model to get out of a political dilemma.

He considers it more than doubtful whether German parents in Frankfurt, Düsseldorf or Stuttgart will put up with the "import of problems" through foreign children in German schools.

He cites a letter which German parents sent to the school authority in Lünen: "We shall not stand by idly while irreparable damage is done to the chances of our children who will become the 'lost minority'."

This letter could have been written by parents in any German city.

Herr Klemm has found that German parents are looking for a school where most children are foreigners. "They are loath to send their 7-year-old daughter to a school four kilometres away from home only so that she should go to school with fewer foreign children," he says.

Moreover, the daily bussing imposes considerable strain on the children.

His most important objection to the bussing system and the reshuffling of children in elementary school to keep the quota of foreigners below 30 per cent is that there can never be genuine integration "if the school integrates in the morning and the parents separate in the afternoon."

Sibel Alper is an example: she never plays in the afternoon with the girl who shares her desk at school in the morning. Nor do they ever visit each other at home.

"We have no evidence of friendships developing between German and foreign children," concedes Antonius Beermann, the scientific project head of the Krefeld scheme. And should a foreign child be invited to a German child's birthday

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■ SCIENCE

Dispute over 'body-clock' experiments

Tests by behavioural scientists on the human "biological clock" are to end because the institution involved is to be closed.

The Max Planck Institute at Erling-Andechs, near the Ammersee in Bavaria, has been carrying out the experiments since 1964 with volunteers spending time in an underground bunker cut off from their normal environment.

Some of the findings show that our bodies have 25-hour cycles, not 24-hour.

However, the justification for closing the institute, according to Max Planck Society spokesman Robert Gerwin, is that the pioneering work has largely finished or is being continued at other universities.

This is disputed. A member of the team involved in the experiments, Professor Rütger Wever, says: "We had not noticed that our work was anywhere near finished."

The volunteers taking part in this test spend four weeks in an underground bunker which used to belong to the Wehrmacht. In this time, they are completely cut off from all contact with the outside world.

The experiments have been going on since 1964 and in this time 237 people have spent between 28 and 89 days underground.



Life in an underground bunker: 25 hours in a day? (Photo: MPG)

The project team is led by Professor Jürgen Aschoff. He will retire when the institute closes, and no successor has been found.

Wever says that the conditions for the experiments in this bunker are ideal. It is completely cut off from light and noise from outside. The only connection with the outside world is a slit through which food and letters are passed.

Aschoff, 66, has long been interested in inner processes in the human body. He studied medicine at Freiburg University. Then he specialised in the study of biological rhythms: do animals and human beings live according to outer clocks such as the change from day to night? Or is their behaviour influenced by their own inner clocks? And if so, how do they work?

To answer these questions, Aschoff needed to be able to isolate people completely from the outside world. In the bunker, people live according to their own notions of time. They can go to bed whenever they feel tired and decide on their daily timetable independently of the rhythm of their environment.

Wolfgang Miethge, a 30-year-old psychologist, was one of the volunteers. Before going to sleep he had to put electrodes on his head so that the structure of his sleep could be recorded. During the day, Miethge took concentration and reaction tests. He also gave urine samples.

He describes his time in the bunker: "I decided my own daily rhythm. When I felt really awake, I got up. I had no orientation whatever and had only my own rhythm to go on."

He said he was only bored for an hour during the entire four weeks. He worked on his doctral dissertation, listerned to records and read. "I never felt any anxiety. But I probably would have been bored if there had been no pressure to work."

Like all the other volunteers, Miethge was asked to tick off the days. When according to his reckoning 25 days had passed, the test was over.

Miethge's results are typical of those of many volunteers. His daily rhythm differs from the normal 24-hour rhythm. Miethge's rhythm was a 27-hour one. In other words, his inner hour was three hours behind in these conditions.

As the biological clock does not have an exact 24-hour rhythm, scientists talk of "circadian" periods. The average circadian period of the volunteers was 25 hours, one hour longer than the ordinary day.

In these conditions of isolation, the relation between temperature and day-night rhythm also changes. Under normal conditions, our body temperature is highest in the evening and lowest in the early morning.

In the case of these volunteers, the temperature maximum occurred only a few hours after the day began and the lowest body temperature was a short while after the volunteer fell asleep.

Could it be then that the sleeping-waking rhythm and body temperature are regulated not from one but from several clocks? Observation of two thirds of the volunteers seems to confirm this.

Among these volunteers, the temperature curve has a 25-hour rhythm, but the times of sleeping and waking are completely out of cue. Some volunteers had 18-hour days, others prolonged their period of activity and rest to 50 hours.

The amazing thing is that none of the volunteers even noticed this. And there

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Short-sighted people 'are cleverer'

Short-sighted people are cleverer. Tests in several West German *Länder* have shown that although only 15 per cent of the total population are short-sighted, the proportion of the myopic among intellectuals is two to three times higher.

Professor P.-D. Steinbach of the Düsseldorf Marienhospital, provided a plausible explanation of this phenomenon in the Stuttgart medical magazine, *Deutschen Medizinischen Wochenschrift*. Steinbach says that short-sightedness and intelligence are connected as the result of a sifting of genetic variants. This means that the short-sighted individual, because of his frailty, concentrates on activities where short-sightedness is no hindrance.

He is therefore more likely to turn to academic studies than to sports. In this way, eyesight, like other physical factors such as strength, sensitivity to heat and to light, becomes effective as a classifying factor.

The final result of this sifting as a result of genetic factors is a certain biological type in which characteristic combinations of physical features are frequently found. These in turn are connected with typical behavioural characteristics.

What the south Germans call *Grossköpfe* and the Americans egg-heads are basically no more than characterisations of members of a particular social class or profession on the basis of their typical features, which distinguish them from other comparable groups.

Short-sightedness is very often found in conjunction with tallness, weakness of the connective tissue, flat feet and stomach and kidney subsidence.

The reason that such characteristic features become more pronounced from one generation to another is, according to Steinbach, that as our external living conditions become standardised genetic factors assume ever greater importance.

Biological social types and the proportion of short-sighted people in certain

DIE WELT

groups will increase, because people from similar social backgrounds tend to intermarry.

A study at a Berlin schools produced an impressive illustration of the connection between short sightedness and intelligence.

Thirty-five per cent of grammar school pupils weres short-sighted, but only nine per cent of special school pupils and secondary modern school pupils without the leaving certificate suffered from short-sightedness.

In all, the proportion of short-sighted children of graduates, civil servants and office workers was high.

There was also a correlation in size. Children who were above average height when starting school but not short-sighted tended to become short-sighted more frequently than other children.

The general opinion now is that children do not become short-sighted because they read a lot — they read a lot because they are short-sighted.

Angela Heck
(Die Welt, 7 June 1980)

SOCIETY

Punks: gathering power of an undefined philosophy



An arch-enemy: a "popper"
(Photo: S. Heydekampf)

Graffiti like "Chaos in the Fed. Rep. of Germany", "No power for nobody" or "Death to the Teds" abound.

They are written by one of the most bizarre segments of our youth subculture: the punks.

They consider themselves social outcasts and do all they can to fill this role. "Rather a poor Punk than a bourgeois swine" is their motto.

They are natural enemies not only of the teds but also of the "poppers", a modern, German version of the mods (of rocker fame).

The movement was imported a couple of years ago from Britain, where it originated in the slums of London.

Originally, these outsiders were brushed aside as an exotic phenomenon of our day.

"The toughness and violence most of the punks try to demonstrate is nothing but show," wrote a major German news magazine.

Eventually, punk music became chic as a sub-species of rock. This developed into the new wave music, and the punks were no longer mentioned except in connection with this type of music.

But horror headlines in the past few months have proved that there is more to them than music.

It began on a spring weekend in Hamburg when punks invaded Pöseldorf, an upper-class suburb.

They demolished cars, beat up some of the "beautiful people" having tea in their gardens and engaged in a fierce battle with the police.

Though many were taken to prison, the punks struck again only a few days later in the city centre of Hamburg.

The 12 to 20-year-olds grabbed dozens of sidewalk café chairs and tried to block off the Mönckebergstrasse shopping area.

Another battle with passers-by and the police ensued and again many punks were taken to prison.

And only a couple of weeks ago about 100 young people stormed a concert of the British punk band "The Clash." There were many injured as the invaders beat up the musicians. Ironically, it was band leader Joe Strummer, 27, who had tried to defend himself by hitting out with his guitar, who was arrested. The concert had to be cancelled.

The reason for the attack was that "The Clash" are considered traitors by hard core punks because they deviated from tough polit-punk movement for the sake of a lucrative contract with a recording company.

This bodes no good for certain German groups such as "Dr Koch Ventilator" and "Extra Work". They, too, have contracts with recording companies.

Hamburg's Senator Werner Staak, who is in charge of security recently said that he had full understanding for the fact that some of the people were worried about punk excesses.

He considers the violence perpetrated by the punks (many of whom are unemployed) as much of a problem as were the socalled "Rockers" several years ago.

Punk violence is directed against the establishment as a whole, though it concentrates on the socalled Teds. ("Teds make you puke").

Herr Staak is having punks who were arrested by the police brought home from their cells by their parents, hoping that the parents will make it clear to the children that violence leads nowhere. But most parents find themselves powerless.

In fact, the punks themselves are vague as to what they expect of life. Their attitude can best be summed up with a line from a popular song of "The Clash": "I run through the empty stone because I'm all alone." *dpa*

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 13 June 1980)



The age of punk. (Photo: ...)

Counselling centre founded to help Berlin's prostitutes

An organisation to help prostitutes has been founded in Berlin.

The aim is to provide counselling and specialist advice on the law, insurance and tax.

It will be done through a centre to open in July in the inner Berlin area of Charlottenburg.

Another function of the centre will be to motivate the prostitutes to train for jobs. The emphasis will be on self help.

Though the funding of the project is still uncertain, the initiators are confident that Bonn will provide the cash.

There are about 4,000 registered prostitutes in West Berlin.

They work in brothels and massage parlours or simply pound the pavement. Most of their customers are married men, from all social strata. But only the prostitute, not the customer, is socially ostracised.

In a society that maintains its moral standards by providing an opportunity ... circumvent them, the prostitutes form a peripheral group.

Branded as criminals and sexual deviates, they live in society's ghettos.

This very moral condemnation forces the prostitute to remain in her ... environment.

The fear of stepping out of the accustomed surroundings into an unknown ... environment and the attendant feelings of inferiority makes the prostitute increasingly dependent on her pimp. She has no claim to health insurance and pension under the social security system ... a hopeless situation.

The new society could help to alleviate some of these hardships.

Bettina Schroeter-Kleist

(Der Tagesspiegel, 8 June 1980)

'Body clock'

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was no change in their concentration — arithmetical tests proved this.

These tests could cast new light on many other fields of research. The tests showed for example that the body reacted differently at different times of day to drugs.

Penicillin, in small doses, is most effective between 7 p.m. and 4 a.m. Statistically, this antibiotic is most effective against infectious diseases when administered at 20.32 p.m.

Correctly applied, these results could have be very relevant in sport. The training effect, for example, is much greater at 5 p.m. for example than at 9 a.m.

Although the results of chronobiology have raised innumerable questions, the Institute is to be closed.

But Professor Wever is not going to give up. "We will continue our work somehow, even if it has to be under another name." *Günther K. H. Zupanc*

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 7 June 1980)

School bussing

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party, his parents are usually very reluctant to let him accept the invitation.

This is certainly not the sort of political integration Krefeld's mayor had in mind.

In any event, nobody in Krefeld knows what will become of integration after elementary schooling.

If Sibel goes to *Hauptschule* (the minimum compulsory schooling preparatory to vocational training), as do most other Turkish children, the one to the ratio will be untenable anyway.

The Krefeld ratio is like that of any other German city — one to one. What these children do have in common is that their fathers are blue-collar workers.

Klemm says it is intolerable that it should be this group, which in any event consists of underprivileged children, that is saddled with the unsolved problems of our aliens policy.

But what sort of solution would offer a genuine chance of children like Sibel?

Educationalists of Herr Klemm's ilk would like to see the determination and single-mindedness with which Krefeld implemented its bussing and reshuffling system applied differently: "Integration only stands a chance of success if it included all school-going children in a city borough and if there is no skimping on teachers and educational aids," he says.

In political terms, this means the removal of the traditional differentiation between the various forms of schooling. But, says Klemm, "it is very difficult, if not impossible, to realise such structural changes."

Six years ago, when the Institute for Research into School Development, Dortmund, of which Herr Klemm is a member, tried to evolve a scheme to solve Frankfurt's problems with foreigners, he and his team foundered on the political timidity of the SPD majority at the time. Today's prospects (and not only in Frankfurt) are even worse.

No-one now thinks anymore of replacing the present system by a single type of school to be attended by all children though offering a variety of curricula.

The Social Democrats, now have also yielded to the parents' wishes and the demand that the comprehensive school be introduced as a fourth type of normal school (next to *Realschule*, *Gymnasium* and *Hauptschule*). And all plans for a replacement of the traditional, three-tier system by a comprehensive school have been shelved.

The Dortmund Institute doubts that the "parents' wish" to continue the integration begin in Krefeld's elementary schools will be enough for it to in fact continue.

Even avid supporters of the project are too angry and disappointed to show any inclination to shoulder additional problems.

Moreover, all good resolutions ... when it comes to a person's own child. "The opposition to the comprehensive school will grow once the German middle and upper classes realise that in ... *Gymnasium* and *Realschule* they ... spared the foreign students they ... have in a comprehensive school."

A bleak view that is out of keeping with the optimistic statements made by politicians. But, says Herr Klemm, "a minimum realism will get us further politically and could even help us to ... mingly insurmountable hurdles."

"This is an appeal to reason and a sense of responsibility towards children like Sibel and towards the children of German blue collar workers.

Herr Klemm: "Unless something happens, out cities will disintegrate into individual ethnic ghettos."

Meanwhile, Krefeld's information brochure states: "Sibel Alper — a Turkish Krefeld girl, ... born in Turkey and growing up in Krefeld, she has two home countries. She will make her way in life."

But will she? *Jutta Roitsch*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 June 1980)

SPORT

European soccer takes on new gloss

West Germany has won the European soccer championship. They beat Belgium 2-1 in the final in Rome following qualifying rounds. The Hamburg player, Horst Hrubesch, scored both goals. In the play-off for third place, Czechoslovakia beat Italy, the host nation, in dramatic fashion. The match proper ended 1-1 and was decided 9-8 on penalties.

After flopping at Lake Placid and deciding not to enter for Moscow, West Germany was virtually left with the European soccer championships in Italy as the sporting event of the year.

Boycott demands would have made no difference to this soccer highlight. The European championships might just as easily have been held in Moscow.

After all, there was talk of boycotting the 1978 world championships in Argentina, but nothing came of it. Yet in Italy the TV cameramen all but boycotted the event.

The day before the European championship tournament began they were talking in terms of laying down tools because they were not being allowed sufficient expenses.

But this was only a momentary flurry, since soccer is unquestionably the most popular sport in Europe. Pre-war poet Joachim Ringelnatz, a writer of humorous verse, took the football craze to task, but to no effect.

With soccer reigning supreme in Europe, the European championship falls little short of the world championship in importance, with only the South American countries as Europe's major world rivals out of the reckoning.

South America is undoubtedly the second stronghold of the soccer code. Apart from Brazil, Argentina and so on, the only countries missing from the world championship cavalcade were, say, the Australians or the Africans.

But although they add colour to the world championships they are never more than also-rans from the sporting point of view. So their inability to qualify for the 12-day European championship tournament in Italy will not have made much difference to the outcome.

But European soccer fans are not uncritical. They expect value for money, and most countries competing gave cause for complaint.

Italy, the host country, was reeling from the effects of a football pools bribery and corruption scandal. Unable to rig the European championships, Italy managed no more than a goalless draw against Belgium, who thus went through to the finals against West Germany.

Italian fans were still discussing the repercussions of the domestic scandal revelations, so the opening fixture, Czechoslovakia against West Germany in Rome, was seen by a poor crowd.

Roman soccer fans were clearly more interested in the outcome of the league fixture between Lazio, their local club, and Catanzaro.

West Germany was still suffering from the blow to its prestige at the world championships in Argentina two years ago, although the team has undergone substantial changes since 1978.

In Argentina West Germany fielded one of the oldest team squads, whereas in Italy it had one of the youngest, and under the guidance of Jupp Derwall, the new coach, the team had lost none of its prevous 15 international encounters.

It travelled to Rome after 10 wins in the row yet still did not enjoy the confidence it once enjoyed. It was as though the squad had done well in mock exams but might yet fail to pass muster on the day.

True enough, the German team did seem to be suffering from a bout of exam nerves in the Olympic Stadium at Rome. It was a full hour before Karl-Heinz Rummenigge of Bayern Munich put the first score on the board.

The fans must have breathed a sigh of relief. It would have been a disastrous sporting year indeed if, after the Lake Placid and Moscow fiascos, West Germany had flopped in Italy too!

Horst Hollmann

(Nordwest Zeitung, 12 June 1980)



The clincher: Horst Hrubesch heads the winning goal past Belgian goalkeeper Jean-Marie Pfaff to give West Germany the championship. (Photo: dpa)

Mental strain on the way to world decathlon mark

Decathlon world record-holder Guido Kratschmer lay flat out at Bernhausen, near Stuttgart, after finishing his final event with 27 points more than Britain's Daley Thompson, who himself had beaten Bruce Jenner's Montreal world record only a month previously.

It was minutes before he was fully conscious again. Then a smile came over his tired and overstrained face. He had totalled 8,649 decathlon points, 27 more than Thompson and 242 more than Jürgen Hingsen from Uerdingen in the Ruhr, whose 8,407 had taken him at one fell swoop to No. 6 in the world ratings.

"It is," he said, "a world record for me, for my coach and for my relations." These words spoken by the 26-year-old farmer's son from Bavaria are unlikely to be forgotten by national decathlon coach Wolfgang Bergmann.

Bergmann has helped Kratschmer, now a student of physical education at Mainz University, throughout his career. It began internationally with a surprise European bronze medal at Rome in 1974.

Kratschmer went on to take silver medal as runner-up to Bruce Jenner of the United States at Montreal aged 22. In 1978 he was unable to take home the European championship title because of injury.

But by way of consolation he set up a European record decathlon points tally. This year, another even year, he has gone on to set a new world record.

The moment of triumph, in his 25th career decathlon competition, came near the end of his sporting career. "The world record means more to me than my Olympic silver medal. I shall never improve on it. My career is nearing its conclusion."

He was planning to retire regardless, and the possibility, suggested in Bernhausen, that he might be capable of even more is unlikely to make him change his mind.

In 1975, as a physical education student, he passed 'mountaineering' proficiency tests. He now feels he has scaled the Mount Everest of the decathlon, or could yet well do so.

"Yes, I reckon I could make it 8,800 points. The Bernhausen competition should have been held four weeks later."

But for the time being his personal Everest will remain at 8,649 points, a tally he reached by steady improvements from one event to the next.

It included his second-best 100 metres time of 10.58 seconds and a mere 4cm below his best distance of 7.84 metres in the long jump.

His 15.47 metres in the shot-put were the exact distance he was aiming for, whereas 2 metres in the high jump was 3cm below his personal best.

His 48.04 seconds over the 400 metres came as a personal disappointment in comparison, but this was only the first day. More was to come.

Some 1,500 spectators saw him go from strength to strength in a sun-splashed arena on Day 2 of his world record bid. It began with a West German season's best time of 13.92 seconds in the 110 metres hurdles.

Then came 45.52 metres in the discus, 4.60 metres in the pole vault and 66.50 metres in the javelin, all strictly according to schedule, according to Kratschmer.

After 9 out of 10 events his tally was 8,019 points, or 17 more than Daley Thompson, who on 18 May had been the first man ever to clear 8,000 points at this stage of the proceedings.

This left him with a 1,500 metres race he had to finish in 4 minutes 27.9 seconds to clinch a new world record. In the toughest race of his career ("Never have I been so *kaputt* beforehand") Kratschmer passed the post in 4 minutes 24.2 seconds.

Between events he took catnaps under a parasol, looking supremely relaxed. He whiled away the time taking massage and thinking ("I couldn't afford to have any doubts as to my ability to pull it off").

TV interviews came as a disturbance and he slept badly during the night between his two world record days. "The mental strain really took its toll. Never before have I worried much about the points," he said.

This time he too started doing mental arithmetic. But the coloured Briton's May world record had not left him feeling he had to improve on it.

Weeks beforehand, with West Germany almost certain not to enter for the Moscow Olympics, he had noted that "a new world record is the only option left open to me now Moscow has gone by the board." *Gerd Holzbach*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 June 1980)

Cartoons

Continued from page 10

authors and directors tended to prefer nice middleclass children for their film reports, whether fictional or documentary.

Too many films were expensively produced in a sterile studio atmosphere, they said.

For the first time the Prix Jeunesse gave participants the chance to see all the works in the three new categories (telling stories; information; music and entertainment). Showings were followed by detailed discussion and analysis.

This was a major improvement. In previous festivals, participants had to concentrate on certain rather outmoded categories (pre-school, children's and young people's films) if they wanted to avoid overlapping of showings and possibly missing something worthwhile.

There was widespread approval of the new system and after nine days we had the satisfaction of having seen an overview of 'International children's and young people's films'.

The organisation was, as usual, perfect and this made things easier for everyone concerned, creating an atmosphere in which discussions and conversations beyond the frontiers of national TV organisations could be held.

Heiko Mundzeck

Guido Kratschmer over the bar. (Photo: Werek)

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 June 1980)